The Black Sea: A live fire zone for GNSS interference

While Russia’s electronic warfare systems have long targeted Ukrainian military operations, the Black Sea has increasingly emerged as a gray zone for GNSS denial, impacting civil aviation, international shipping, and regional infrastructure.

From mid-2024 onward, reports of GPS jamming and spoofing persisted in the Romanian Flight Information Region (FIR), over the Danube Delta, and across the maritime zones surrounding Crimea, and these effects are not confined to the battlefield. Civilian aircraft have reported false positioning, maritime AIS systems have shown ships “teleporting” inland or spinning in circles, and scientific missions have directly recorded spoofing signals at high altitude.

The scale and consistency of this interference suggest that the Black Sea is no longer just a border zone – it is a live, contested arena in Russia’s wider information warfare campaign.

Summary

• Location: Black Sea coastlines and maritime FIRs, including Romanian airspace, western Crimea, and the western Black Sea
• Activity: Persistent GNSS spoofing and jamming affecting aircraft, vessels, and scientific sensors
• Date highlight: Spring 2025 – consistent GNSS degradation observed by commercial pilots, scientific missions, and national defense authorities
• Impact zones: Southeast Romanian FIR, Constanța coast, Danube Delta, Snake Island corridor, offshore platforms, maritime traffic lanes

Real-world incident

In late 2024 and into spring 2025, reports of GPS interference in the Black Sea region surged. Romanian officials, aviation observers, and civilian monitoring platforms all documented increasing spoofing and jamming activity, most of which originated from Russian-controlled Crimea.

Scientific confirmation of high-altitude spoofing (Aug 2024 – Feb 2025)

In August 2024, the Romanian firm InSpace Engineering launched a high-altitude balloon from Constanța to monitor GNSS spectrum quality over the Black Sea. The payload recorded persistent jamming across all GNSS bands and a definitive spoofing event at ~11 km altitude, where the reported position abruptly shifted toward Simferopol in Russian-occupied Crimea.

Flight data confirmed the balloon never physically deviated from its path, pointing to external signal manipulation. The team later published spectrograms showing full-band interference across L1, L2, and L5, marking the first scientific confirmation of high-altitude GNSS spoofing in NATO airspace.

Regional escalation and independent monitoring (August 2024 – April 2025)

Between late summer 2024 and spring 2025, GNSS spoofing in the region reached new levels of scale and severity. According to OPSGROUP’s 2024 GPS Spoofing Report, the global aviation community observed a 500% increase in spoofing incidents, peaking at an average of 1,500 spoofed flights per day.

While the report did not attribute activity to a specific region, Romanian and Bulgarian pilots began filing real-time reports in February of signal degradation, false GNSS positioning, and sudden navigation dropouts while flying along the Black Sea coast. These incidents aligned with public telemetry and scientific data showing consistent spoofing vector patterns that resolved eastward, often pointing toward Simferopol in Russian-occupied Crimea.

In May 2025, Romania’s Chief of Defense publicly confirmed that GNSS spoofing and jamming “occur weekly” along the country’s coast, describing the interference as part of a broader “hybrid warfare” strategy that often coincides with naval movements and drone activity.

Maritime impact and persistent risk (April – May 2025)

By spring 2025, spoofed GNSS signals over the Black Sea had reached near-daily frequency, with merchant vessels east of Constanța and south of Snake Island among the most consistently affected. Civilian AIS systems displayed erratic positioning – ships appearing inland, spinning in circles, or drifting far off established maritime routes.

These spoofing patterns echoed those seen in Russia’s “Baltic Bermuda Triangle”, and were captured in MarineTraffic screenshots throughout the region.

While some signal distortion may appear random, analysts believe much of the interference is intentional, designed to obscure military activity or mask strategic movements. The consequences extend well beyond navigational confusion: ships risk regulatory violations, insurance disputes, and collision hazards, particularly in congested maritime corridors near the Danube Delta and Romanian offshore platforms.

Notably, this maritime interference often coincides with Russian electronic warfare activity in Crimea, reinforcing the pattern of GNSS denial as a tactical smokescreen for broader hybrid operations.

Yet while public reports and operational data confirm the scale and risk of interference, most civilian platforms lack the resolution or visibility to trace signal origin or detect manipulation in real time. This is where Spire’s satellite-based RF monitoring system adds critical value – not only validating interference, but mapping its scope, directionality, and operational impact from orbit.

Spire Satellite Validation

What Spire saw

The following satellite-confirmed incidents showcase how GNSS spoofing activity escalated inland and along the Romanian coast through fall 2024 and into spring 2025. These Spire Aviation snapshots provide concrete telemetry evidence supporting the open-source observations outlined in earlier reporting.

Persistent spoofing over Buzău, Romania (October 2024)

Throughout  October 2024, Spire Aviation’s satellite-based  constellation detected a cluster of GNSS spoofing anomalies over central-eastern Romania, specifically along the flight corridor of the August 2024 high-altitude balloon mission launched by InSpace Engineering.

In three adjacent hexes spanning east-west from Buzău to Ploiești, GNSS integrity metrics showed severe signal degradation that is consistent with spoofing:

• nacp_q05 = 0 in all three zones: this indicates that the lowest 5th percentile of ADS-B messages received in each region reported a NACp value of 0, meaning at least 5% of messages showed complete GNSS position degradation. In practice, this likely reflects GNSS loss affecting multiple aircraft, not just isolated messages.
• nic_q10 = 7 or 8 in all three zones: this means that 90% of ADS-B messages reported a NIC value of 7 or higher, indicating high signal integrity. This pattern of strong signal confidence despite degraded or incorrect positioning is a classic signature of GNSS spoofing, where the spoofed signal appears reliable to receivers but delivers false location data.

One hex captured data from up to 399 aircraft, reinforcing that this was not an isolated anomaly, but a persistent regional interference event.

While the spoofing signal itself likely originated from a local or regional source, the false positions resolved eastward near Simferopol, in Russian-occupied Crimea – mirroring the directional spoofing vector recorded by InSpace. During descent, the balloon’s receiver abruptly snapped to a spoofed position near Ayvazovskogo Airport in Crimea, despite remaining physically over Romanian airspace.

Together, this spatial correlation and spoofed positional alignment confirm that the August spoofing incident was not a one-off anomaly. Instead, it was part of a broader, ongoing GNSS interference pattern affecting NATO airspace through fall 2024.

 

 

High-confidence spoofing over Danube Delta, Romania (August 2024 – April 2025)

Satellite validation from Spire Aviation confirms a persistent GNSS spoofing pattern across southeastern Romania and the Danube Delta region, aligning with pilot-reported anomalies, OPSGROUP alerts, and military assessments from late summer 2024 through spring 2025.

Spire’s satellite-based monitoring system detected recurring spoofing signatures across multiple high-traffic air corridors near Galați, Brăila, and Tulcea – three strategic nodes within Romanian FIR airspace and near NATO’s eastern flank.

Spoofing events confirmed by Spire telemetry

On October 8, 2024, a spoofing incident was recorded over the Tulcea–Babadag region. Spire Aviation telemetry showed that at least 10% of aircraft in this airspace had no valid positional accuracy (nacp_q10 = 0 and nacp_q05 = 0), while simultaneously reporting moderate signal integrity (nic_q10 = 6, nic_q05 = 6). This combination is a textbook spoofing signature: aircraft systems continue to trust the GNSS signal because its integrity rating remains acceptable, but the positional data being delivered is either missing or false.

The result is a navigation environment where aircraft unknowingly operate with degraded spatial awareness—one of the core risks of GNSS spoofing.

Eleven days later, on October 19, a second spoofing event was detected in the exact same hex. In this instance, 5% of aircraft again experienced total position failure (nacp_q05 = 0), while most reported high positional confidence (nacp_q10 = 8) and consistent signal integrity (nic_q10 = 6).

The persistence of this pattern within the same airspace indicates a sustained interference campaign rather than an isolated anomaly. It also reinforces concerns about the repeatability and reliability of GNSS signals in this corridor during periods of heightened regional tension.

By October 26, spoofing indicators appeared in an adjacent hex to the northeast, directly over the Galați–Reni corridor, near the Romanian–Ukrainian border. GNSS metrics again showed position failure in at least 5% of aircraft (nacp_q05 = 0) with strong positional confidence (nacp_q10 = 8) and stable signal integrity (nic_q10 = 6).

With 17 aircraft contributing to the dataset, the data confirms that spoofing was active even with moderate air traffic volume. The shift eastward also suggests possible expansion of spoofing coverage or repositioning of the signal origin – both of which hold implications for cross-border risk.

Together, these incidents reveal a high-confidence spoofing pattern targeting Romanian airspace in fall 2024. The consistency of the metrics, recurrence across time, and movement across neighboring hexes paint a clear picture of deliberate GNSS interference along NATO’s eastern edge.

These signals not only disrupt air navigation, but they also create dangerous operational blind spots in one of Europe’s most sensitive geopolitical regions.

Spoofing expansion along Bulgaria’s Black Sea coast (May 2025)

In late May 2025, Spire Aviation’s satellite-based  monitoring system confirmed ongoing spoofing activity in NATO airspace along the Bulgarian coast, including two key events in the weeks leading up to the now-public characterization of the region as a “Black Sea Bermuda Triangle.”

In both cases, the spoofing signatures followed the same pattern:

• nacp_q05 = 0: At least 5% of received ADS-B messages reported no positional accuracy, likely indicating GNSS spoofing affecting multiple aircraft, though the exact number may vary.
• nacp_q10 = 8 and nic_q10 = 7: Majority of aircraft reported excellent GNSS signal quality
• nic_q05 = 4 (May 24) and 1 (May 31): A small percentage showed degraded signal integrity
• Large sample sizes: 441 and 385 aircraft, respectively

This is a textbook spoofing profile, with pilots and onboard systems reporting a high level of confidence in a GNSS signal that is delivering false or absent location data. The illusion of signal health masks the reality of manipulated positioning, creating serious risk in congested air and sea corridors.

 

Just four days after these satellite-confirmed events, civilian monitoring platforms and ship operators publicly described the Black Sea as exhibiting “Baltic Bermuda Triangle” behavior, where commercial vessels were seen spinning in circles, drifting inland, or teleporting across maritime zones on platforms like MarineTraffic. While initially anecdotal, this Spire Aviation telemetry provides hard evidence that GNSS spoofing was active, frequent, and escalating along Bulgaria’s coast during the final weeks of May 2025.

Together with high-altitude spoofing confirmed by InSpace Engineering, pilot reports submitted to OPSGROUP, and official Romanian defense statements, this coastal spoofing campaign illustrates a multi-domain interference strategy – degrading GNSS integrity across the maritime, aviation, and scientific sectors in one of Europe’s most strategically sensitive theaters.

The impact of Spire Aviation’s satellite data

While traditional public platforms like gpsjam.org offer broad visuals of interference zones, they rarely provide directionality, signal behavior, or attribution confidence. Spire’s LEO-based constellation fills that gap by capturing real-time GNSS telemetry from aircraft, including signal quality, positioning confidence, and interference signatures at scale.

This isn’t just validation. It’s insight.

In the Black Sea region, Spire Aviation’s data didn’t just show where spoofing occurred – it revealed how signals were behaving, how frequently spoofing reoccurred, and how GNSS confidence remained deceptively high even in corrupted zones. That level of resolution allows civil and defense operators to assess operational risk, not just anomaly presence.

Interference pattern and attribution

Spoofing incidents detected by Spire Aviation in fall 2024 and spring 2025 consistently showed directional resolution eastward toward Russian-occupied Crimea. High-altitude spoofing recorded by scientific teams matched flight-based telemetry captured by Spire, with false GNSS positions often snapping toward Simferopol or the vicinity of Ayvazovskogo Airport.

This directional spoofing, coupled with the persistent presence of mobile and sea-based EW systems observed by open-source analysts, suggests a strategic campaign emanating from Crimea and its surrounding waters. Rather than isolated bursts, the interference reflects a layered GNSS denial strategy designed to obscure military movement, mask drone activity, and challenge NATO situational awareness across air and sea domains.

Operational impact

The risks in this story go well beyond “GPS glitching.” GNSS spoofing in the Black Sea region affects:

• Civil aviation: False positions, navigation dropouts, and corridor drift
• Maritime commerce: Regulatory violations, collision hazards, and AIS spoofing
• Scientific missions: Data loss, corrupted baselines, and safety threats
• NATO readiness: Degraded ISR and unreliable GNSS across eastern flank FIRs

In contested or congested airspace, false confidence in location is more dangerous than signal loss. When aircraft or vessels believe they are in the right place, but are not, the result is blind operation under false assumptions.

Spire Aviation’s telemetry-based detection system helps uncover that illusion, alerting operators to invisible threats that traditional RF monitoring can’t capture in time.

Get in touch to explore Spire’s GNSS‑interference data feed or request a demo:

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Continue reading our GNSS interference report series

01: GNSS interference report: Russia – Part 1 of 4: Kaliningrad & the Baltic Sea
02: GNSS interference report: Russia – Part 2 of 4: Crimea and the Black Sea Region
03: GNSS interference report: Russia – Part 3 of 4: Moscow and major urban zones
04: GNSS interference report: Russia – Part 4 of 4: Black Sea & Romanian airspace (current)

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Moscow and major urban zones

While much of Russia’s GNSS electronic warfare (EW) activity remains concentrated near the frontlines and contested regions, a growing share of interference is now appearing in major urban centers, with Moscow at the core.

Amid heightened fears of Ukrainian long-range drone attacks, Russia has increasingly deployed mobile and fixed GNSS jamming systems throughout its capital. These deployments often coincide with national holidays, security alerts, and known periods of UAV incursions, effectively converting the capital into a contested airspace with intermittent GNSS denial.

Summary

• Location: Moscow & surrounding airspace
• Activity: GNSS jamming, cellular interference, and urban-scale electronic warfare deployments
• Date highlight: May 2025 – widespread deployment of jamming equipment in central Moscow due to heightened drone threats
• Impact zones: Central Moscow, airports (Vnukovo, Sheremetyevo), adjacent restricted airspace, urban zones around the country

Real-world incident

In the weeks leading up to Russia’s Victory Day celebrations on May 9th, 2025, a clear pattern of GNSS interference emerged over Moscow and its surrounding airspace. Driven by rising fears (and reported incidents) of Ukrainian UAV strikes targeting symbolic and military assets in the capital, Russian forces initiated a wave of urban-scale electronic warfare deployments that temporarily disrupted civilian navigation and air traffic.

Phase 1: escalating drone threats (April 25 – May 7, 2025)

Open-source reports from AeroTime and Insider Paper confirmed a wave of long-range Ukrainian drone attacks targeting Moscow and surrounding regions in the weeks leading up to Victory Day on May 9th – one of Russia’s most important secular holidays.

Key drone strikes on May 7th included the Shaykovka Air Base in Kaluga and the Kubinka Air Base near Moscow. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber acknowledged the symbolic intent of the Kubinka strike, suggesting it aimed to disrupt the aerial segment of the parade.

Flight operations were suspended at Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports, with over 100 cancellations, 140 delays, and widespread diversions to St. Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport. Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed 524 drones were intercepted nationwide on May 7th and 8th, marking the largest single UAV barrage since the start of the war.

Telemetry data from GPSjam.org showed stable, and sometimes growing, GNSS interference in and around Moscow between April 30th and May 6th, aligning with escalating drone alerts and airspace closures.

Phase 2: peak interference during victory day (May 7–9, 2025)

As the Victory Day parade approached, an event attended by foreign leaders and featuring coordinated military flyovers, authorities seemingly escalated GNSS interference efforts across Moscow and throughout the region. High-powered jammers were reportedly deployed near the Kremlin, key government ministries, and all three major airports near Moscow.

These measures coincided with full-scale emergency airspace restrictions under Russia’s Kovyor plan, which halts all civilian flights when unidentified aerial objects are detected. The result was a sweeping impact on commercial aviation and urban mobility.

According to Insider Paper and AeroTime, more than 60,000 passengers were affected by grounded or delayed flights in and around Moscow during this period. Airports saw dozens of cancellations and hours-long shutdowns as air defense units responded to continued drone threats.

Telemetry data from GPSjam.org, from May 7–9, shows an increase in ADS-B flight disruptions, forming overlapping jamming zones throughout Moscow airspace. The intensity of the interference aligned with major parade events, especially during high-traffic periods, suggesting the use of short-duration, high-power jamming pulses intended to secure the airspace without extended shutdowns of critical systems.

These concentrated jamming windows also overlapped with commercial aviation corridors, raising risks for aircraft operating on legacy GNSS-reliant systems and requiring rerouting, visual flight rule fallback procedures, or reliance on backup inertial navigation systems.

Phase 3: post-celebration residual jamming (May 10–20, 2025)

In the days following Victory Day, GNSS interference in Moscow persisted but appeared to become less severe, and at times, it was localized around federal buildings, government zones, the MKAD (Moscow Ring Road), and other urban areas around the country.

These reactivations suggest the deployment of semi-permanent or mobile jamming platforms, such as truck-mounted EW systems or containerized field units. Rather than a continuous blanket of interference, the post-event pattern indicates a responsive jamming posture – activated during perceived threats, intelligence alerts, or shifts in aerial surveillance patterns.

The continued disruption also mirrors broader Russian electronic warfare doctrine, which increasingly treats major urban centers as defensible electronic zones during high-alert periods.

Spire satellite validation

What Spire saw

In the lead-up to Russia’s Victory Day celebrations on May 9th, 2025, Spire Aviation’s satellite-based GNSS monitoring revealed a three-phase pattern of electronic warfare over Moscow: a sustained baseline of GNSS interference, a sharp tactical escalation surrounding Victory Day, and a prolonged period of residual jamming in the days that followed.

Unlike static jamming events seen elsewhere, Moscow’s interference profile during this time was dynamic and coordinated, likely shaped by political optics, military activity, and growing threats from Ukrainian drone incursions. By analyzing percentile-based signal degradation (NACp_q05) alongside changes in aircraft behavior, Spire Aviation was able to isolate when and where interference evolved from persistent background noise into a targeted operational tool.

Phase 1: escalating drone threats (April 25 – May 7, 2025)

From April 30th through May 6th, Spire Aviation detected continuous GNSS signal degradation across central and western Moscow, including the Kubinka corridor, where Ukrainian drones struck military airbases. Each day, more than 2,500 unique hexes exhibited degraded positioning or signal integrity (nacp_q05 = 0), with over 1 million GNSS telemetry data points observed operating within these affected zones over the course of the week.

Phase 2: peak interference during victory day celebrations (May 7–9, 2025)

In the days surrounding Russia’s Victory Day celebrations, Spire Aviation’s GNSS monitoring detected not only sustained interference but a stark concentration of signal degradation affecting a high volume of aircraft over a narrow urban footprint.

To isolate the core disruption zone, we filtered GNSS degradation (NACp_q05 = 0) by aircraft count within each hex. As the threshold of impacted aircraft increased – from 20 to 40, 60, and finally 100 – the geographic distribution of degraded zones collapsed inward, revealing a probable epicenter of jamming.

This concentric collapse points to a centralized, high-power jamming source operating in or near Zelenograd, northwest of central Moscow, during the peak interference window.

 

 

 

This behavioral signal, when paired with the drop in GNSS telemetry volume during May 5–7, suggests not only widespread jamming but deliberate signal saturation over critical airspace. The tactical precision of this escalation, centered around Moscow’s most symbolic holiday, aligns with prior state responses to perceived threats from UAVs and validates the strategic nature of GNSS disruption as a tool of information warfare.

While the Victory Day parade itself took place in Red Square, the historic center of Moscow, Spire Aviation’s data shows that the highest GNSS disruption was concentrated further northwest, near Zelenograd. This geographic offset suggests a layered defense strategy: rather than broadcasting jamming directly over the Kremlin, Russian forces likely positioned high-power emitters along probable UAV routes. The spatial collapse of interference zones toward this location reinforces the use of GNSS disruption as a perimeter-based countermeasure to shield critical infrastructure from aerial threats.

Phase 3: post-celebration residual jamming (May 10–20, 2025)

While Moscow remained the focal point of Victory Day interference, Spire’s satellite data from April 30th to May 20th reveals that GNSS jamming did not subside; it dispersed and persisted. In particular, urban areas across central and eastern Russia exhibited elevated GNSS degradation after the Victory Day celebration, with more than 40 aircraft per hex impacted by total loss of positional accuracy (NACp_q05 = 0).

The images below show the contrast in interference between the week leading up to Victory Day and the week after.

 

The contrast between these two periods shows that GNSS interference did not subside after the May 9th holiday – it persisted, with sustained jamming activity observed across multiple urban centers well beyond Moscow.

This continuity becomes more telling when viewed alongside recent UAV strike data. Several of the cities that experienced continued or elevated interference between May 10th and 20th had also been targeted by drone attacks earlier in the year, suggesting that GNSS interference is being used as an ongoing countermeasure in regions deemed vulnerable to aerial threats.

Kazan (January 2025)

Between May 9th and May 20th, Spire satellite telemetry shows persistent GNSS jamming in Kazan’s urban airspace, with over 40 aircraft per reporting hex losing positional accuracy (NACp_q05 = 0). While it’s not confirmed with total certainty, this localized interference is observed months after a drone strike on a key facility located in Kazan.

On January 20, 2025, kamikaze drones targeted the Kazan Aviation Plant, a facility central to the production and modernization of Russia’s Tu-160 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers. The strike occurred around 5 a.m., reportedly causing an explosion and fire on the factory airfield. Although local officials claimed all drones were intercepted and no infrastructure was damaged, open-source imagery analysis indicated that fuel tanks near the KAPO-Composite hangar were hit. This hangar specializes in the manufacture of composite components for long-range bombers and civilian aircraft under the Tupolev design bureau.

The strike’s location, deep within Russian territory, underscores the evolving reach of Ukrainian UAV operations. Its target selection suggests a deliberate attempt to disrupt high-value military-industrial capacity. The presence of renewed GNSS jamming in Kazan’s airspace months after the incident points to a lingering defensive response. It reflects a broader trend in which electronic warfare assets are being repositioned in direct response to UAV threats, reinforcing the idea that GNSS denial is no longer confined to ceremonial events or border regions but a persistent urban countermeasure in strategically sensitive zones.

Ufa (March 2025)

Between May 9th and May 20th, Spire Aviation data shows consistent GNSS interference over Ufa, with multiple urban hexes reporting complete positional loss (NACp_q05 = 0). This jamming activity follows a drone strike on one of Russia’s most strategically significant oil refineries.

In the early hours of March 4, 2025, local emergency services in Ufa reported a fire at the Ufa oil refinery, one of the largest in Russia, with an annual capacity of around 20 million tons. While Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations acknowledged the fire, it did not specify a cause. No casualties were reported, and the blaze was reportedly extinguished after seven hours.

However, Ukrainian official Andriy Kovalenko publicly described the incident as a UAV strike, stating that the facility plays a critical role in fueling Russia’s military – producing aviation fuel, diesel for armored vehicles, and essential lubricants for both ground and air operations.

Russia’s Defense Ministry did not acknowledge any aerial activity over Ufa, but it did report intercepting seven Ukrainian drones elsewhere that same night. The lack of attribution, combined with open-source claims of a strategic hit, points to growing uncertainty (and concern) over Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian territory.

Spire’s interference data suggests a localized, post-strike electronic warfare response, consistent with a broader trend of GNSS denial emerging in cities linked to military infrastructure or prior UAV incidents. In Ufa’s case, the timing and concentration of jamming reinforce the view that Russia is maintaining an elevated defensive posture in zones it now considers vulnerable.

Samara (March 2025)

Spire Aviation’s satellite data shows elevated GNSS interference in Samara’s airspace from May 9th to May 20th, with hexes indicating total positional loss (NACp_q05 = 0) and more than 40 aircraft impacted in some zones. This activity followed a reported drone strike in March on the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery, one of the region’s largest industrial facilities and a known supplier of military-grade fuel.

On March 10, 2025, Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the refinery, which has a capacity of up to 8.8 million metric tons annually and is operated by Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned oil giant. While the Samara governor downplayed the incident, claiming no damage or fire occurred, Russia’s Emergency Situations Ministry contradicted this with video evidence showing firefighters battling flames inside a warehouse. Ukrainian officials, including spokespeople from the National Security and Defense Council, confirmed that the refinery was the intended target and emphasized its strategic role in fueling Russia’s military operations.

The timing and location of the strike underscore Ukraine’s continued effort to disrupt key energy infrastructure linked to the war effort. The recurrence of GNSS interference in Samara’s airspace two months later suggests a sustained defensive posture in response to that vulnerability. As with Kazan and Ufa, the interference aligns with previous UAV activity and reflects Russia’s apparent shift toward localized, threat-responsive jamming around critical infrastructure nodes.

The impact of Spire’s satellite data

Spire Aviation’s LEO-based GNSS monitoring provides not only confirmation of jamming activity across Russia’s urban centers but also granular insight into its operational footprint, timing, and escalation pattern. By using percentile-based signal degradation (NACp_q05) and applying aircraft count filters to identify only statistically significant interference zones, Spire is able to detect, visualize, and timestamp GNSS disruption as it unfolds, all without reliance on government or ground-based sources.

This capability proves especially valuable in contested information environments, where denial, misdirection, or delayed attribution are common. Spire Aviation’s data helps understand when jamming is being deployed reactively, proactively, or symbolically, and helps to isolate potential emitters based on geographic collapse patterns, interference density, and correlation with high-value targets or strategic infrastructure.

Interference pattern and attribution

The pattern emerging from spring 2025 suggests a clear evolution in Russian electronic warfare doctrine. GNSS jamming, once primarily deployed along frontlines or during ceremonial state events, is now appearing in major urban centers in direct response to UAV threats. In Moscow, this manifests as preemptive signal denial around holidays like Victory Day. In Kazan, Ufa, and Samara, jamming reappears weeks or months after confirmed or suspected drone strikes, implying a defensive repositioning of mobile EW assets.

In several cases, Spire Aviation’s data shows interference originating not at the strike site itself, but at likely UAV approach corridors, hinting at perimeter-based jamming strategies intended to confuse or block drone navigation systems before they reach high-value targets.

Attribution of interference events to specific platforms remains complex. However, the concentric collapse of aircraft-affected hexes seen near Zelenograd and the post-strike reactivation patterns observed in multiple cities strongly suggest the use of mobile, possibly truck-mounted or containerized EW systems with tactical jamming range, rather than broad, indiscriminate denial fields.

Operational impact

The effects of GNSS interference across Moscow and other urban zones in spring 2025 were both civilian and strategic. For commercial aviation, the disruptions were immediate and visible. Aircraft operating within the affected airspace experienced degraded positioning, in some cases requiring rerouting or reverting to fallback navigation procedures such as visual flight rules or inertial systems. During the Victory Day period alone, more than 60,000 passengers were impacted by flight cancellations, delays, and diversions, including partial shutdowns at Moscow’s Vnukovo and Domodedovo airports.

At the strategic level, GNSS jamming appears to serve a dual function: both as a deterrent against UAV incursions and as a masking tool for Russian military activity. By denying signal access across critical airspace, Russian forces can inhibit drone navigation while simultaneously concealing the movement or deployment of sensitive defense systems.

Get in touch to explore Spire’s GNSS‑interference data feed or request a demo:

Crimea and the Black Sea Region

Russia’s use of electronic warfare (EW) around Crimea and the Black Sea region has shifted from isolated jamming events to a dynamic, mobile strategy that is actively shaping battlefield conditions in southern Ukraine.

Once an epicenter of Russia’s GNSS interference operations, Crimea remains heavily fortified. However, key systems, such as Pole-21 satellite jammers, are being strategically redeployed to more contested areas when necessary, particularly along the Kherson–Mykolaiv corridor. This shift represents a tactical evolution: GNSS jamming is no longer a static form of disruption for Russia, but a responsive tool used to adapt to drone-driven threats and front-line pressure.

Interference in this region not only confuses ISR drones and aircraft positioning, but it has now become a direct factor shaping military decisions, operational tempo, and tactical planning on both sides of the conflict.

The key takeaway? EW in the Black Sea is no longer fixed. It’s mobile, adaptive, and synced to the rhythms of modern, drone-intensive warfare.

Summary

• Location: Crimea and Kherson Oblast, Ukraine
• Activity: Strategic relocation of Russian air defense and GPS jamming systems, including Pole-21
• Date highlight: March-April 2025 – Electronic Warfare (EW) systems moved from Crimea to Kherson; targeted destruction of Russian jammers on April 14.
• Impact zones: Southern Ukraine frontlines, Black Sea coastal regions, and surrounding airspace

Real-world incident: Frontline jamming & tactical response

In late March 2025, resistance sources affiliated with the ATESH movement reported that Russia was moving Pole-21 GPS jamming systems out of southern/central Crimea and redeploying them to Kherson Oblast. The reports were interpreted as an effort to reinforce EW coverage near the increasingly active frontlines around Oleshky and the Dnipro River delta, where Ukrainian drone strikes and precision targeting are intensifying.

The Pole-21 system is designed to jam GNSS signals and communications links, particularly those used by UAVs and guided munitions. Open-source GPS interference maps from gpsjam.org showed a corresponding shift in GNSS disruptions during this time, with signal degradation appearing in areas matching reports of newly-placed Russian air defense systems near the border.

Then, on April 15, Ukraine reportedly responded with a drone strike that destroyed a Borisoglebsk-2 jamming complex near Kamianske in the Kherson region. According to a video released by Ukraine’s Operational Command South, the strike used two UAVs – one to disable the system and the second to destroy it entirely. The Borisoglebsk-2 is one of Russia’s most advanced EW platforms, capable of conducting up to 30 simultaneous jamming tasks, and has an estimated value of $200 million.

This event marked a rare publicly visible instance of Ukrainian forces successfully targeting a high-value EW system deep behind the lines. While the exact timing of the strike remains unconfirmed, its release signaled Ukraine’s growing emphasis on degrading Russian jamming capabilities to regain tactical airspace advantage.

Although the operational impact of the strike is difficult to confirm through open-source maps alone, the event adds an important dimension to the evolving EW landscape in southern Ukraine, highlighting both the vulnerability of mobile Russian jamming platforms and the increasing precision of Ukrainian UAV strikes.

Spire satellite validation

What Spire saw

This section draws on data from Spire Aviation’s GNSS interference monitoring constellation, specifically filtered to highlight confirmed, high-confidence jamming activity over southern Ukraine and Crimea.

We limited the analysis to:

• Records where NACp_q05 = 0, indicating a complete loss of horizontal position accuracy at the 5th percentile – a strong signal of GNSS degradation
• Hexes with ≥5 aircraft reporting, to eliminate statistical noise or single-point anomalies

This filtering ensured we captured only repeatable, aircraft-validated interference events, providing a more conservative and operationally meaningful dataset.

March 12-28, 2025

During this window, GNSS interference was heavily concentrated over western Crimea, including Sevastopol, Yevpatoriya, and Saky. These locations are consistent with known Russian EW deployments and match historic interference patterns visible in public datasets.

Figure 1 shows this pattern clearly: jamming is restricted to the Crimean peninsula, with no detectable interference north of the border in Kherson Oblast or along the Dnipro Delta front.

March 28-April 28, 2025

A sharp geographic shift occurs toward the end of March. Interference expands north and west of Crimea, appearing for the first time in Spire Aviation’s dataset near southern Kherson Oblast, including airspace over Armyansk and the Black Sea coastline.

This timing aligns with open-source reporting of Russian EW asset redeployments from Crimea to the southern front. Specifically, partisan networks and military analysts reported that Pole-21 systems were being repositioned to defend against increasing Ukrainian drone and strike activity near the Kherson-Mykolaiv axis.

Figure 2 shows interference activity now spanning both Crimea and southern Ukraine, suggesting that mobile jamming systems were either relocated or temporarily co-deployed near the border.

Still, one key anomaly stands out. Between April 14 and April 16, jamming activity over Kherson Oblast disappears entirely – a brief blackout during an otherwise continuous interference period. This 48-hour blackout directly precedes the April 15 release of video footage showing a Ukrainian drone strike on a Borisoglebsk-2 jamming system near Kamianske.

While Spire Aviation’s dataset cannot confirm the exact cause of the lapse, and the drone impact site lies inside inactive Ukrainian airspace, the timing is consistent with either a system loss or a tactical shutdown of local EW operations in response to the intrusion. The interruption highlights how even within sustained jamming periods, interference can pause, reposition, or retreat based on evolving threat conditions.

April 28-May 12, 2025

A sudden drop in interference is observed again starting late April. Hexes across southern Kherson Oblast and the adjacent coastal region go dark with no qualifying GNSS degradation detected, despite ongoing aircraft traffic present.

Figure 3 highlights this change. Jamming remains visible in Crimea but disappears entirely north of the peninsula, suggesting either a temporary EW stand-down, a redeployment of mobile assets, or a lull in active jamming missions.

The gaps observed, which were both brief and sustained, showcase the value of high-resolution satellite data in capturing not only GNSS interference, but its timing, volatility, and operational behavior.

The impact of Spire’s satellite data

Spire Aviation’s data provides critical insight into the operational rhythm of electronic warfare, not just its presence. While public sources can show that jamming occurred, they cannot reliably pinpoint:

• When interference intensifies
• Where jamming systems relocate
• When and where interference ceases

In this case, Spire Aviation’s data reveals a three-phase evolution of GNSS jamming across the southern front:

• Pre-relocation: Static interference confined to Crimea
• Frontline expansion: Interference spreads across Kherson Oblast airspace
• Operational pause: Jamming vanishes abruptly from high-priority airspace

This progression offers a strategic lens into real-world EW behavior, illustrating how interference not only expands and persists, but also retreats, pauses, and adapts in response to battlefield conditions.

Interference pattern and attribution

Spire Aviaton’s GNSS telemetry reveals a clear three-phase evolution of interference in southern Ukraine between March and May 2025:

1. Localized disruption over Crimea (March 12–28), consistent with static EW installations
2. Expansion into Kherson Oblast (March 28–April 28), suggesting mobile deployment of Pole-21 systems
3. Abrupt interference pauses, including a brief 48-hour blackout (April 14–16) and a sustained outage (April 28–May 12), showing either tactical repositioning, system loss, or command-level deactivation

These patterns align with both open-source reporting of EW system movement and Ukraine’s tactical countermeasures, but only Spire Aviation’s data captures their timing, location, and duration with aircraft-based precision.

Operational impact

GNSS jamming across southern Ukraine directly affects:

• ISR and UAV operations, by degrading satellite-based navigation and targeting
• Civilian air traffic, especially at low altitudes along contested corridors
• Battlefield coordination, where digital targeting and movement depend on reliable GNSS data

The presence, and sudden absence, of interference in key zones reflects both Russia’s evolving EW strategy, as well as moments of vulnerability. Spire’s high-resolution monitoring enables early detection of these changes, improving situational awareness for aviation, defense, and civil resilience stakeholders.

What’s next

Part 2 investigated Crimea and the Black Sea, where Ukrainian drone strikes are thought to have disrupted and reshaped Russian jamming operations. In Part 3, we’ll shift focus to Moscow and major urban zones, where short-duration, high-intensity jamming is increasingly used to defend high-value infrastructure from long-range UAV threats.

Using Spire Aviation’s GNSS interference data, we’ll analyze how mobile jamming assets are deployed during high-alert periods, including Victory Day, and how these urban interference patterns impact both military operations and civilian aviation.

Get in touch to explore Spire’s GNSS‑interference data feed or request a demo:

Kaliningrad & the Baltic Region

Kaliningrad Oblast, wedged between NATO members Poland and Lithuania, has emerged as the Baltic’s most persistent GNSS interference zone. The region hosts both known electronic warfare installations and suspected mobile jammers, both on land and at sea.

In October 2024, maritime jamming strong enough to affect flight navigation was confirmed, with high-confidence attribution to vessels operating offshore. These mobile sources regularly affect aircraft and shipping in the EEZs of Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden, raising operational risks across the region.

Summary

Real-world incident

Over a 6-month period in 2024, researchers at Gdynia Maritime University and GPSPATRON in Poland monitored GPS disruptions with on-campus sensors situated just over 70 miles east of Kaliningrad. Over those 6 months, they detected 84 hours of GNSS interference, with 29 hours of that total observed in October alone.

In October, researchers observed up to 7-hour stretches of GNSS disruption affecting all four major satellite constellations (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou). Position errors exceeded 30 meters, enough to compromise safe routing for ships and aircraft. The interference patterns, matched with vessel movement, point to ship-borne jammers operating in international waters.

By correlating the interference patterns with real-time vessel movement, researchers provided strong evidence that the source was mobile jamming devices aboard ships underway. This marked one of the first publicly verified cases of ship-based GNSS jamming in the Baltic Sea, with additional interference events detected across the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Poland, Sweden, and Lithuania.

The findings increase the growing concern over mobile maritime interference as a newer, more unpredictable source of GNSS disruptions, which increasingly affect marine and aviation environments.

Spire satellite validation

What Spire saw

Spire Aviation’s satellite-based analysis captured GNSS integrity metrics (NIC) and positional accuracy (NACp) across more than 300 aircraft on 14 October 2024. While most aircraft (q10 cohort) maintained normal performance, the bottom 5% (q05) showed total collapse in both NACp and NIC, as shown in the table below. This collapse was concentrated within a specific hexagon (shown in Figure 1) where a subset of aircraft experienced complete GNSS failure while others nearby remained unaffected.

Metric	10th percentile (q10)	5th percentile (q05)	What it means
NACp	7 (< 75 m accuracy)	0 (no fix)	A minority of aircraft lost all positional accuracy, while others remained unaffected
NIC	5 (moderate integrity)	0 (no integrity)	A small subset of receivers flagged positional data as unusable

Table 1: Performance of aircraft transiting the hexagon shown in Figure 1, where GNSS interference was most severe.

Because q10 values remain relatively healthy while q05 values collapse, the interference is deemed localized and inconsistent across aircraft. This is consistent with directional jamming or a mobile emitter impacting some aircraft more than others, depending on altitude, position, and heading.

This pattern is visible in Figure 1, which shows a central hex identified as one of the strongest and most likely interference zones for the day. In contrast, Figures 2, 3, and 4 show nearby hexes with diminished disruption – fewer affected aircraft, partial metric degradation, and ultimately, a weaker or more distant jamming signal. This progression helps illustrate how GNSS interference intensity decreases with distance from one of the suspected jammer’s core influence areas.

Figure 1. Spire hex‑map, 14 Oct 2024: central red cells show q05 = 0 for NACp & NIC. Adjacent cells retain increasingly normal values, confirming the jammer’s finite footprint.

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Figure 2. Northern hex shows moderate q05 degradation, indicating some aircraft experienced reduced GNSS integrity. However, no full collapse occurred, suggesting this hex sits inside the jammer’s reach but outside its peak cone.

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Figure 3. Southwest hex shows no q05 collapse and minimal aircraft impact, indicating it sits outside the effective jamming cone. The absence of interference closer to land further strengthens the mobile emitter hypothesis.

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Figure 4. Western hex reports normal NIC and NACp values across both q10 and q05 cohorts, supporting the conclusion that the jammer was not land-based, especially not located in Kaliningrad.

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Why does this point to mobile jammers?

Several clues in Spire’s dataset indicate that the interference source on 14 October was likely maritime:

• Geographic isolation: The most affected hexes are in open water. Disruption does not increase as aircraft approach Kaliningrad, weakening the case for a land-based emitter.
• Rapid falloff: As shown in Figures 2 through 4, GNSS degradation weakens quickly across adjacent hexes, consistent with a directional or moving signal origin.
• Selective aircraft impact: q05 values collapsed while q10 values remained stable. This points to localized jamming affecting only those aircraft positioned in a narrow cone of interference.
• High altitude effect: The affected aircraft were flying at altitudes up to 36,000 feet. That profile is consistent with upward radiation from sea-level, not fixed spoofers or urban EW systems.

While open-source platforms often flag only complete blackouts or a range of interference, Spire’s percentile breakdown reveals localized interference in international waters – data that points not to stationary emitters, but likely to mobile assets operating across borders and jurisdictions.

Using passive RF detection from low Earth orbit (LEO), Spire recorded a marked decline in reliable ADS-B signals from multiple aircraft transiting the region surrounding Kaliningrad. The degraded signals were spatially and temporally concentrated in international airspace directly adjacent to the Russian exclave, which is consistent with the signature of onboard GNSS receivers experiencing interference, rather than spoofing or aircraft-based system failure.

Interference pattern and attribution

Over the past few years, the Kaliningrad exclave has become one of Europe’s most active GNSS jamming zones. Situated between NATO members Poland and Lithuania, Kaliningrad is home to several known Russian electronic warfare (EW) units. Reports have also linked ongoing GNSS interference to the Tobol system, a mobile jamming unit that restricts satellite navigation and communications over broad areas.

These reported disruptions are not one-off events. As early as 2024, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued Safety Information Bulletins warning operators of persistent signal degradation in the Baltic region, particularly in airspace proximate to Kaliningrad and the Russian coast.

Academic and Spire data together indicate the October event was a maritime extension of that capability, likely a naval or paramilitary platform demonstrating area‑denial over NATO corridors.

Operational impacts

GNSS jamming near the Baltic Sea has affected civil aviation, NATO surveillance missions, and commercial maritime traffic. Area Navigation (RNAV) Approaches – procedures that allow aircraft to navigate along pre-defined flight paths without support from ground-based navigation systems – have been regularly disrupted, forcing aircraft to revert to long-used and semi-outdated ground-based navigation procedures.

The growing scale and frequency of these events have prompted closer coordination between regional air navigation service providers and calls for rapidly available space-based interference detection solutions that can be deployed today.

Why Spire’s view is critical

In this Baltic Sea case study, the value lies in how Spire’s telemetry reveals critical patterns that conventional heat maps miss. Three reasons:

1. Hidden severity: q05 vs q10 spread
   In the primary interference zone, 3 out of 53 aircraft experienced full GNSS collapse. That may seem minor, but with directional or mobile jammers, this pattern is expected. Only aircraft in the right slice of airspace at the right moment are affected. For operators, even a small cluster of failures becomes a red flag, especially when those failures concentrate along a defined corridor.
2. Mobile attribution: Spatial fingerprint
   On October 14th, the worst-affected hexes appeared offshore, with no signal gradient leading back toward land. That spatial isolation (GNSS denial over open water rather than near fixed EW infrastructure) strongly suggests a mobile emitter, likely operating from a vessel.
3. Cruise phase impact pattern
   Although altitude data wasn’t directly extracted, the affected airspace lies well offshore, in regions typically transited by aircraft at cruising altitudes. The pattern aligns with an emitter at sea level radiating upward, consistent with maritime jamming, not ground-based spoofing or low-elevation urban jammers.

Bottom line for Baltic stakeholders

It is highly probable that a single mobile emitter created navigation blind spots capable of disrupting RNAV procedures and undermining safety. Spire’s percentile telemetry suggests that this event may not be a benign anomaly.

What’s next?

Part 2 investigates Crimea & the Black Sea, where Ukranian drone strikes drastically affected Russian jamming strategies. We’ll apply the same Spire analytics to expose mobile jamming tactics used around Russian assets.

Get in touch to explore Spire’s GNSS‑interference data feed or request a demo:

What are GPS jammers?

GPS jammers are exactly what they sound like – devices used to block or interfere with GPS or other types of GNSS signals. Most often, a GPS jammer is a small, compact device – but different types of jammers can take on a variety of physical structures or morphologies.

The most common GPS jammers are considered “chirp jammers.” Chirp jammers quickly change their frequency over time, sweeping across the frequency range to overpower a GPS signal. Since the chirp signal ‘sweeps’ across a frequency range, typically between 1565-1585 MHz, they can often overpower an entire range of signals rather than a single frequency.

GPS jammers can be as simple as a device that plugs into a car’s cigarette lighter port or more bulky, complex devices with dozens of antennas.

Simple GPS jammers

The simplest types of jammers, often the cigarette lighter jammers, are used to disable tracking in trucks and cars – broadcasting RF signals on the L1 band at approximately 10mW.

These are typically used by truck drivers or civilians who have concerns over tracking, either by their employer or the government.

Complex GPS jammers

More complex jammers (sometimes called hedgehog jammers due to their many antennas) are often used by criminals looking to jam multiple radio signals at the same time – such as Wifi, GPS, and cellular signals. Criminals may want to use these types of jammers to disable alarm systems, hide the location of contraband or stolen materials, or prevent satellite-based navigation services.

These types of jammers are becoming more common and readily available and present a growing threat to industries and the public. Hedgehog jammers typically broadcast on the L1 or L2 band at around 10W.

How do jammers affect a GPS receiver?

The effects of jamming on a GPS receiver can vary widely depending on factors such as the jammer’s distance from a receiver, surrounding physical environments, or RF characteristics.

One common way to understand if a receiver is experiencing interference is to simply read the operations manual, which typically provides normal operating parameters. If the receiver is not operating within the parameters outlined by the manufacturer, it could be a sign of jamming.

Since the same type of jammer or jamming signal can affect a receiver in different ways, it’s important to understand how a GPS jamming device may typically be affected by a jammed signal. The effects of jamming can vary or not exist at all.

1. No effect: If the jammer is out of range of the receiver or the center of frequency is not aligned with the targeted frequency, the receiver does not experience any disruption.
2. GPS signal degradation: As the carrier-to-noise ratio of the received signal drops, so does the quality of the GPS device. This is often signified by inaccurate or low-precision navigation.
3. No GPS signal received: If the jammed signal is within range of the receiver and on the correct center of frequency, the receiver may not receive any GPS signal and completely fail to function until a signal is picked up again.

A study of GPS jammers and their signal characteristics

The following GPS jammer types were studied by scientists from the Radionavigation Lab at the University of Texas at Austin. The 18 commercially available jammers included in the study were categorized based on morphology (physical structure) but did not include every time a GPS jammer was in existence.

The study’s aim was to analyze the signal characteristics of some of the most commonly used GPS jamming devices – allowing them to better understand and strategize mitigation against GPS jamming occurrences.

The three categories of GPS jammers in this study include:

1. Cigarette-Outlet Jammers (L1 Band Only)
2. Rechargeable Battery/External Antenna Jammers (L1 and L2 Bands)
3. ‘Cell Phone’ Jammers (L1 and L2 Bands)

The study utilized two types of live experimental tests.

1. The first test examined the frequency structures and power levels of the jammer signals.
2. The second test gave an estimate of the effective ranges of the jammers when used against common commercial GPS receivers.

Study results

The tests presented the following findings across the 18 commercially available GPS jammers under observation when tested against some of the most common commercial GPS receivers.

Test 1: (Frequency Structures and Power Levels of Jamming Signal)

• All of the jammers used some type of sweeping tone to generate broadband interference.
• Most of the jammers used linear chirp signals.
• All of the jammers affected the L1 band, six jammed the L2 band, and none of them jammed the L5 band.
• The sweeping signal period lasted 9 microseconds on average, sweeping across a range of no more than 20MHz.

Test 2: (Estimate of Effective Jamming Ranges)

• The weakest jammer affected tracking at around 300 meters distance and acquisition at around 600 meters.
• The strongest jammer affected tracking at a range of approximately 6000 meters distance and acquisition at around 8500 meters.

Geolocating GPS jammers

While GPS jammers can be hard to locate, it is possible, and many companies have made it part of their mission to improve geolocation capabilities to enhance public safety and national security.

There are two primary ways to locate the position of a GPS jammer.

GPS ground station networks

As you might assume, a ground station network is typically in a fixed location, so geolocating the source of a jammed signal is only possible within a certain range of the ground station.

Ground stations can not be used to search for interference sources across broad spatial ranges, so the application for GPS jammer geolocation with a ground station is limited.

Spire satellites in Low Earth Orbit

Satellites operating in LEO offer a much more robust capability of GPS jammer identification and geolocation. Since satellites can be deployed across a range of orbits, it makes it possible to search a wide range of terrestrial space or even jammers in motion.

Spire’s growing constellation of small satellites in LEO plays a pivotal role in addressing the growing threats of GPS jamming and spoofing. Our satellites are equipped with versatile RF payloads that cover a broad range of frequency bands, including VHF, UHF, L, S and X band,- enabling to-the-minute monitoring of legitimate and illegitimate signals. Since our satellites cover such a broad range of frequency bands, it allows us to detect and monitor signals from phones, push-to-talk radios, GPS jammers and spoofers, and more.

While we satisfy a wide array of needs for our customers, we have traditionally worked with customers with needs in government, commercial, and defense operations, be it in the US or abroad.

One of our most valuable and unique qualities is that we offer a flexible approach to RF intelligence solutions, many of which can be tailored to specific missions or organizational operations. We can design, construct, and deploy satellites with custom payloads in a matter of months, not years, allowing for rapid defense solutions that are both timely and scalable.

Learn more about Signals Intelligence Constellations

What is GNSS spoofing?

GNSS spoofing (GNSS/GPS spoofing) is carried out by transmitting local RF signals that are coded to trick a GNSS receiver into thinking that it’s somewhere it is not (false position fix), at a different point in time (false clock offset), or both.

It’s also possible to rebroadcast genuine GNSS signals from other locations or times and pass them along to a target receiver.

There are numerous applications for GNSS spoofing. Spoofing a GNSS signal could lead a cargo vessel into pirated waters or make a military drone run a course in the wrong direction, for example.

How does GNSS signal spoofing work?

Different methods are used to spoof GNSS signals, but two of the most common are modifying existing GNSS signals (Carry-Off) or intercepting and rebroadcasting signals (Meaconing).

Even a cheap Software Defined Radio (SDR) can make a smartphone using GNSS believe that it’s in the middle of the ocean, for example, when, in fact, it is in landlocked Nebraska.

Carry-off attacks

A common type of GNSS spoofing is called a “carry-off attack” – which is done by broadcasting fake signals that are synchronized with legitimate signals seen by the targeted GNSS receiver.

Once tracked by the targeted receiver, the false signal can be amplified to a higher power level, which is then preferred by the receiver.

After the receiver picks up the spoofed signal, the timing location can be slowly dragged into a false range based on the objective of the spoofing attack.

Meaconing

Meaconing, on the other hand, describes a spoofing attack with re-transmitted GNSS signals, which does not require costly or advanced technology.

To execute this, a navigation signal is intercepted and rebroadcasted on the received frequency using a higher power than the initial signal.

A GNSS repeater can be another source of a meaconing attack.

GNSS repeaters are found in places like airport hangars so that GNSS signals can be received indoors, and when the power level of a repeater is increased intentionally or unintentionally, it could lead to a false position.

Indicators of GNSS spoofing

There are some pretty clear indicators of GNSS spoofing, and by knowing what they are and when they pose a threat, it’s easier to mitigate signal spoofing incidences or even locate the spoofing source.

Value jumps

Both spoofed and valid GNSS signals can be received by a GNSS receiver at the same time. When the receiver is tricked by false GNSS signals, range measurements will change rapidly to the new false values.

It is not possible to have these changes with legitimate GNSS signals, so the rapid value changes are almost always an indication of interference.

Time stamp anomalies

Satellite data streams can also show discontinuities when the GNSS receiver switches from tracking the legitimate signal to the fake one, and equally so for time indication.

Discontinuities are easily detected during a playback or meaconing attack, as the time stamp jumps backward when the replay begins.

Doppler shifts

A Doppler shift describes a change in the wavelength of radio waves in relation to the observer (the receiver, in this case), who is in motion relative to the source of the radio waves.

Radio waves and sound waves both experience Doppler shifts in the same way, depending on how the GNSS satellites and receivers are moving. So, a Doppler shift from an object’s motion is the same for all GNSS satellite signals, as they all come from the same direction.

The uniformity of these shifts provides a method for indication of GNSS spoofing, as anomalies in Doppler shifts can often indicate a spoofing attack.

Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM)

GNSS receivers equipped with RAIM at the pseudo range level have a built-in defense against spoofing attacks. These receivers are able to detect spoofing from basic spoofing devices when a set of five or more inconsistent pseudoranges are observed.

*The pseudorange is the distance between a satellite at the time of GNSS signal transmission and the GNSS receiver at the time of reception.

Real-world GNSS spoofing: Aircraft spoofing near Turkey and Iraq

In an instance of known GNSS spoofing in September 2023, a flight operating from Europe to Qatar experienced severe interference.

The flight, traveling through airspace in both Turkey and Iraq, first experienced minor jamming in Turkish airspace. As the flight got closer to the border of Iraq, it lost both of its GPS sensors, continuing on its route using backup navigational inputs in the Inertia Reference System (IRS).

Once the aircraft was north of Baghdad, the crew lost all aspects of the navigational systems, and the IRS indicated that the aircraft had drifted approximately 80 miles off track. Further, the avionics were showing a ground speed of 0MPH – which simply wasn’t possible.

In the end, the flight had to complete its route without reliable navigation. While this particular flight arrived without incident, it is a great example of how spoofing attacks can completely interrupt navigation and put an operation at risk.

Protecting your operations with anti-spoofing solutions from Spire Global

Here at Spire, we offer powerful and unique solutions to combat the ever-growing threat of GNSS interference, be it for government, public, or private organizations. With our proprietary constellation of GNSS-enabled small satellites, we fuse a suite of technologies and strategies that help us mitigate the fallout from GNSS jamming and spoofing for our customers.

We employ industry-leading LEO-based satellite monitoring with machine learning and real-time analytics to help us detect, monitor, and strategize against spoofing tactics, and we serve clients with aerospace, aviation, and terrestrial interests – making us one of the most versatile GNSS anti-jamming services around. In short, we enable our customers to embed a layer of defense that ensures the reliability and integrity of positioning, navigation, and timing systems.

It’s no longer enough to take a reactive approach to the evolving threat of GNSS and GPS interference. By partnering with Spire, you gain the unique opportunity to prevent these occurrences and build resilience proactively.

Learn more about our GPS jamming and spoofing detection capabilities

GNSS interruptions and the threat to aviation

GNSS interruptions are a rapidly growing threat to the aviation industry, and GNSS jamming and spoofing occur all day, every day, all around the world. 

The rising threat of GNSS interference

While the aviation industry is dependent on GNSS systems, those signals are extremely vulnerable to disruption. Those who stand to benefit from this have now ‘weaponized’ GNSS interference, and it’s causing very real problems in the global airspace. 

In fact, the growth statistics from recent years are clear.

• In 2021, just under 11,000 GNSS interference incidents were recorded.
• In 2022, that figure jumped to more than 49,000 incidents.
• Between August of 2023 and March of 2024, around 46,000 interruptions were reported over the Baltic region alone. 
• In 2024, the relatively small country of Finland reported 2800 disruptions in just its airspace.

We are seeing a trend: a rapid increase in the number of GNSS interruptions, and they don’t show any signs of slowing. 

While GNSS jamming and spoofing are increasing globally, occurrences are particularly high in high-traffic zones (HTZs), war zones, and regions with ongoing geopolitical conflicts. This is undoubtedly why we are seeing such a spike in the Baltics, although things are trending upward regardless of the war. 

While most countries have laws and regulations around GPS jammers, the devices are relatively easy to obtain, even where they are not legally purchased. Even military jammers are being found in the hands of civilians, so the laws and regulations are not slowing the impact.
 

Aviation security and passenger risk

Apart from efficiency and typical air transit concerns, GNSS interference puts everyday people at risk. For commercial airlines, a loss of GNSS signal results in the plane vanishing from radar. When GNSS signals go missing, so do the planes – at least digitally. In this case, pilots can be forced to divert routes or enact emergency procedures without the security of GNSS navigation – no location on radar and no data about other aircraft in the shared airspace. 

It’s also challenging for air traffic control (ATC), forcing them to manage things with a high level of uncertainty, often attempting to manage multiple aircraft at once. 

Simply put, situational awareness in the airspace is critical to keeping people safe, traveling on schedule, and assets intact. Even brief GNSS disruptions can create a snowball effect that can affect anything and everything in tandem. 

To fully grasp the risks GNSS interference presents to aviation, it’s essential to understand how a simple signal disruption can quickly escalate into a significant loss of aircraft visibility, which we cover below.

Understanding the GNSS interference journey

When GNSS interruptions happen, the impact on aviation isn’t always immediate. Instead, it tends to unfold through a ‘domino effect,’ so understanding each step of the process can help you see how small events can lead to significant problems.

Step 1: The jamming event

Jamming happens when GNSS signals are jammed via signal jammers. This can, and often is, an intentional effort, but jamming can also be unintentional, as GNSS signals are relatively weak and any stronger RF signal on the same frequency can overpower the original.

While jamming sources are often simply handheld GNSS jamming devices, they may also include jamming from military exercises, electronic warfare, or accidental emissions from non-compliant RF devices.

Regardless of the source, once a rogue signal overtakes the original by overpowering the frequency band, legitimate signals are drowned out and no longer recognized.

Step 2: Signal integrity degrades

When GNSS receivers have trouble understanding the difference between legitimate and illegitimate RF signals, all signal integrity diminishes. When this happens, it often results in things like position drift (aircraft ‘seemingly’ wander from their true location), tracking systems lose their ‘lock’ onto known satellite references, and ADS-B degradation (the geolocation position broadcast from aircraft).

By the final stage, aircraft might still be operating normally and without fail, but the systems (and operators tracking them) will start to encounter anomalies that make airspaces hard to manage.

Step 3: Aircraft positional data fails

If or when jamming lasts for an extended period or intensifies over a short window, the situation can become increasingly dangerous.

Not only can an aircraft disappear entirely from radar, but air traffic control teams can no longer reliably track the flight, resulting in the inability to route other flights that could potentially interfere with those not on radar. Pilots might also need to revert to backup navigation, which can increase their workload, operational complexity, and more. Ultimately, this mix puts people and assets at risk.

While most of these outcomes are manageable in open airspaces, condensed or contested airspace is different. Even minor disruptions can evolve into serious risks, so mitigating things that lead to miscommunication, delayed responses, or midair safety issues should be of top interest.

The escalating threat

The threats stemming from GNSS interference are no longer hypothetical, and they are creating a full restructuring of operations within aviation.

Today’s GNSS jamming hotspots

While GNSS jamming is on the rise across the globe, there are specific regions that are currently seeing massive spikes. These occurrences are causing disruptions, delays, and security concerns that have caused havoc for many. 

Today, the following are considered the world’s GNSS jamming hotspots. 

Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean is one of today’s jamming hotspots due to the ongoing political tensions in the region, which include tensions in Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Since GNSS jamming and spoofing have been primary strategies for nations to protect their interests, the region is a ‘high-risk’ zone for jamming and spoofing. 

Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe, the situation is similar to that of the Mediterranean. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is creating a high concentration of electronic warfare, driven by GNSS jamming and spoofing. Nearly every one of Russia’s borders is showing jammed GNSS signals, as seen in the image below. It is important to note that this is likely a mix of civilian and military jamming sources, with the likelihood that the majority are military.

East Asia

In East Asia, the contested South China Sea accounts for most of the jamming, but it also includes the border between North and South Korea, as well as the Yellow Sea. GNSS disruptions in this part of the world have been consistent and continue to disrupt flights and communications in the area. 

Future growth and aviation demand

While it’s obvious that GNSS disruptions are a problem for aviation, that fact is compounded by three clear trends. 

1. Growing Air Traffic: According to forecasts, air traffic is expected to grow to 12 billion passengers, an approximately 33% increase compared to today. By 2042, that number is projected to reach 19.5 billion.
2. Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Expansion: New forms of aircraft and air travel are arriving every day, including drones, autonomous aerial vehicles, and even air taxis.
3. Increased Geopolitical Instability: While geopolitical tensions are always a concern, GNSS jamming and spoofing are now a core strategy within them, so we will continue to see increases in interference globally, even if the number or severity of conflicts remains relatively consistent.

Addressing the pressing challenges involved with today’s aviation landscape is going to take more than typical strategies using ground-based surveillance. At Spire, we are looking multiple steps ahead, creating innovative, space-based technologies to develop solutions now, not later.

How Spire is responding

The present and growing threats of GNSS interference demand more than awareness. They require cutting-edge, innovative technologies and scalable solutions that help provide resilience to the future aviation landscape.

At Spire, we are uniquely positioned to meet the challenge, enabling near real-time interference detection from LEO. Our approach comprises two primary strategies, as outlined below.

1. Spire’s reconnaissance solutions: Interference detection as a data service

Spire operates one of the world’s most advanced space-based RF sensing constellations, actively scanning Earth’s surface for signs of GNSS jamming and spoofing. These spaceborne sensors capture RF anomalies in near real-time, and include things like signal loss, multipath distortion, and power-level inconsistencies that flag spoofing or jamming attempts.

Using proprietary detection algorithms, Spire is able to geolocate and timestamp interference events, track jamming patterns over time, and identify GNSS spoofing based on signal structure and behavioral anomalies.

Organizations are able to tap into specialized datasets that give direct measurements of interference events, can assess the health and quality of satellite signals in specific regions, and alert users of deviations based on GNSS performance patterns.

All interference datasets are available in standard aviation and geospatial formats (GeoJSON, CSV, KML, etc.) and can integrate with existing surveillance systems, decision dashboards, or early-warning tools via API or flat-file delivery.

This is all particularly beneficial to airlines, air traffic controllers, aviation authorities, and military defense organizations, giving insight into the modern airspace where ground systems fail to deliver.

2. Spire’s space-based aviation surveillance: The EURIALO program

In addition to providing real-time data to our customers, we are actively building next-generation surveillance capabilities through our partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA), European Satellite Services Provider (ESSP) and The German Space Agency ( DLR).

Overview of EURIALO

Spire was recently awarded a $16 million contract to design and demonstrate a LEO-based surveillance system as part of ESA’s EURIALO program. This system will outperform traditional ground-based infrastructure used for aviation and create a more resilient surveillance solution.

How does it work?

Direct signal collection: Spire satellites collect aircraft positional data (ADS-B signals) directly from transmitters aboard the plane. Spire’s satellites don’t rely on fixed infrastructure or vulnerable line-of-sight coverage like traditional ground stations. Instead, they capture ADS-B signals from LEO, giving sight across oceans, deserts, and remote territories – areas where ground surveillance stations are typically blind.

On-orbit processing: Signals are processed in LEO with Spire’s advanced software-defined radio (SDR) payloads, executing real-time demodulation, timestamping, and signal characterization directly onboard the satellite. This unique approach reduces data latency, enables rapid decision-making, and eliminates the need to downlink raw RF data before analysis – a critical differentiator in time-sensitive airspace management.

Ground delivery: Aircraft position updates are transmitted to ground stations in near real-time, delivering immediate visibility of aircraft movements. Spire’s global network of low-latency ground stations ensures rapid data dissemination to aviation customers and enables seamless operations, be it for national or commercial applications.

Dual capability: Surveillance + interference detection

EURIALO satellites will help solve two major challenges with a single unified system: aircraft tracking with near real-time updates for aircraft position and trajectory, and GNSS interference detection to help aircraft avoid interruptions in the airspace.

The dual capability drives security for decision-makers, knowing that they can both take a proactive approach to potential problems and manage the situation if unavoidable.

The future of aviation safety requires space-based solutions

The aviation industry can no longer rely on ground-based surveillance systems. They need future-ready management tools that are only accessible from space. 

Before we dig into the specifics, let’s briefly revisit two important questions.

1. Why are ground-based systems no longer enough? Line-of-sight restrictions, terrain interference, regional blackouts, and physical vulnerabilities.
2. Why is space-based surveillance a non-negotiable? A need for persistent global coverage, resilience to localized disruptions, and faster detection/response times.

The reality is that while ground stations still matter, they are not sufficient to safeguard the airspace. Space-based monitoring and detection are needed to build resilience against aviation projections.

Multilateration (MLAT) for GNSS-resilient positioning

While detecting GNSS interference is critical, it’s only half of the solution. When GNSS degrades or is denied, operators need to know when it occurs, immediately, and figure out exactly where aircraft are post-outage. This is where MLAT comes into play.

What is MLAT?

MLAT allows users to determine the location of an aircraft by comparing the time it takes for the ADS-B transmission to reach numerous receivers. Rather than relying on GNSS satellite timing, it functions independently, creating something that is inherently resistant to jamming and spoofing.

Why MLAT matters for aviation security

Independent Verification: MLAT offers a way to independently verify an aircraft’s location without relying solely on GNSS data.

Interference Resilience: Even in regions affected by jamming, MLAT provides reliable aircraft positioning.

Enhanced Safety: Layered surveillance methods (GNSS + MLAT) improve redundancy, instilling trust in aviation tracking systems.

Space-based MLAT, powered by Spire

At Spire, we are already building the foundation for space-based MLAT, which is able to be applied without launching a new class of satellites. It’s the orbital architecture and real-time data capabilities that make it possible.

• Distributed Satellite Coverage: Spire satellites simultaneously receive ADS-B signals from the same aircraft.
• Onboard Processing Power: SDRs analyze signal arrival times in orbit, enabling precise positioning calculations.
• Real-Time Ground Delivery: Final positions are relayed securely to aviation authorities or surveillance platforms within seconds.

Thanks to our already-operational constellations collecting ADS-B signals, MLAT techniques can be implemented, allowing us to deliver GNSS-resilient positioning at scale today.

What is GPS anti-jamming?

Anti-jamming in GPS refers simply to a set of technologies and techniques that are designed to disrupt GPS jamming signals and protect critical systems that rely on GPS.

GPS jamming occurs when an RF signal, often broadcasted intentionally, disrupts and overpowers a GPS signal being relayed from space to an earth-bound GPS receiver. GPS frequency disruptions render navigational systems ineffective or unreliable and can even lead to the destruction or capture of GPS-based technologies like vehicles, ships, and drones.

How anti-jamming technology counters GPS jamming

To counteract GPS jamming, one must enhance the signal resilience of targeted GPS receivers. This can be done in a variety of ways, but the most effective GPS anti-jamming techniques often use adaptive GPS anti-jamming antennas that can detect and prevent jamming signals from reaching the receiver.

These antennas use advanced signal processing techniques that filter out RF noise (improve the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio – SINR), as well as spatial diversity methods that employ two or more GPS antennas to ensure GPS signal capture and enhance signal clarity.

The above techniques are essential in ensuring a GPS receiver can continuously capture GPS signals and are particularly useful in applications like military operations, maritime navigation, supply chain and logistics, and emergency services.

The value of GPS anti-jamming

Regardless of the application, GPS anti-jamming technology is highly valuable, offering services that do everything from enabling autonomous vehicle operation to saving lives in the most dire of situations.

GPS anti-jamming applications

Military operations

When it comes to military and defense, GPS anti-jamming is crucial to maintain security and ensure successful operations. Military forces rely heavily on GPS, be it for communication between personnel, scouting & observation in complex environments, or manned & unmanned vehicle operations, making GPS jamming a severe threat that must be considered at all times.

Since GPS signals can be jammed or spoofed relatively easily, anti-jamming GPS techniques are crucial for safety and success.

Anti-jamming technologies can help ensure successful execution for all sorts of missions and applications in a variety of environments, enhancing the safety of missions and personnel and providing a strategic advantage against adversaries.

Maritime operations

The maritime industry is arguably one of the most threatened by GPS interference, and most entities operating in the maritime space stand to benefit greatly from GPS anti-jamming technologies.

Vessels use GPS for navigation, cargo tracking, supply chain efficiency, and collision avoidance and are even used in emergency search and rescue scenarios such as a man overboard or ship collision. GPS jamming can severely disrupt a ship’s navigation, so vessels and crews are put at high risk when it occurs – especially for prolonged periods or during inclement weather.

Anti-jamming GPS receivers help ensure safe vessel journeys and protect against shipping congestion at ports or in open water. They can also help ensure a secure lifeline for emergency crews in more extreme scenarios.

Aviation operations

In commercial aviation, GPS is imperative to keeping flights on schedule and maintaining a safe and efficient airspace. When GPS signals in airports or the airspace are compromised, flights end up delayed, supply chains are disrupted, and many are left delayed in reaching their destinations.

The fallout of these instances can, and does, cause severe economic loss, which can extend beyond the airlines and even reach into consumers’ pockets.

Weather and climate operations

GPS plays a vital role in weather forecasting, climate research, and agriculture. It’s used in satellite-based remote sensing and weather stations to collect critical data for accurate predictions.

However, GPS jamming can disrupt this flow of information, leading to delays or inaccuracies in forecasting, which can affect everything from flight schedules to disaster preparedness.

One commonly overlooked use for GPS systems is in agriculture, and the economic loss in this sector can be detrimental. Precision agriculture requires to-the-second timing when operating GPS-enabled machinery, and when those GPS signals are disrupted, it can cause negative implications on crop health, yields, and disease.

How?

GPS systems are essential for seeding, planting, irrigating, and harvesting, so any inaccurate GPS position can throw off an entire agricultural operation, affecting all related aspects of the farm for the remainder of the growing season – at least. This can also affect food security depending on the region, possibly putting communities and economies in danger.

Emergency and disaster response

GPS anti-jamming is one of the most critical pieces of technology in the event of an emergency or natural disaster.

Hurricanes, tornados, wildfires, and more can create hectic environments that are hard to navigate safely and efficiently, so having a birds-eye-view of the landscape can drive situational awareness and increase the odds of safe operations.

First responders like police, firefighters, medical teams, and food aid organizations rely on GPS to navigate a disaster area with timeliness and precision. Without it, it could lead to anything from failed rescues to mismanaged supply drops.

For example, most modern conflicts involve heavy amounts of electronic warfare, so when disaster relief teams need to enter a recently affected zone, it’s possible that GPS signals are not available. In this case, teams could arm themselves and their tools with GPS anti-jamming technologies that can help them reach the targeted disaster area and provide the relief needed.

GPS anti-jamming methods

There are three primary methods in which anti-jamming technologies build resilience against jamming signals.

Nulling

When GPS interference is detected, a nulling system generates a “null” in the direction of the GPS jammer being used, which eliminates unwanted RF noise. When more than one jammer is being used to try and overpower a legitimate GPS signal, nulls will be generated in the direction of each jammer.

Beamforming

In beamforming, a “beam,” or RF pattern, is directed towards a known GPS satellite, ultimately making interference less likely, as a jamming signal would need to be coming from the exact direction of the known satellite.

Excision

Excision eliminates any type of narrowband interference that exceeds set thresholds as defined by statistics. Any signal surpassing these thresholds is eliminated, leaving the remaining signals to be transformed for “nulling” – described above.

Types of GPS anti-jamming technologies

Entities use numerous types of GPS anti-jamming technologies to secure their equipment and operations and build resilience to jamming and interference. While different technologies are designed for different applications, they exist to support all types of land, air, and sea-based operations.

Anti-Jam Antennas

A GPS anti-jamming antenna is pretty much what it sounds like – an alternate type of GPS antenna that helps maintain secure GPS connections.

Traditional GPS antennas are often omnidirectional, meaning they can pick up GPS signals from almost any direction. Anti-jamming antennas, on the other hand, focus on a specific direction of known GPS satellites. Focusing signals received from known GPS satellites can reduce the overpowering signals transmitted by GPS jammers.

Another type of GPS anti-jamming antenna is a Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA), which uses beams controlled by a signal processing unit that runs advanced algorithms to detect potential jamming signal patterns and adjust the antenna to prevent a jamming signal from overpowering the target signal.

Anti-jamming antennas like the GAJT-710MS made by Veripos are made specifically for vessels operating in some of the more remote offshore locations of the world. This specific anti-jamming antenna combines an antenna array and “null-forming electronics” into a marine-hardened enclosure that can be installed on nearly any marine vessel, construction site, or offshore drilling rig.

GPS domes

While military-grade anti-jammers are effective for larger vehicles and machinery, they are often unusable for smaller, more compact technologies like drones and UAVs. In response to this fact, GPS domes were created.

GPS jamming has emerged as one of the most prominent threats to commercial and defense drones. Without GPS signals, these small craft are vulnerable to GPS jamming attacks, often leading to craft interception or crashes.

Infinidome is one company developing anti-jamming technologies that can be retrofitted onto small craft like drones, allowing GPS receivers to safely and efficiently secure valid GPS signals while eliminating the opportunity for RF interference.

These anti-jamming domes come in a few different configurations and can defend against L1, L2, and L5 frequencies – depending on the application. They are compatible with nearly any off-the-shelf GPS receivers, offering protection from up to three simultaneous jamming attacks for each band. They are lightweight, compact, and use little power, making them some of the most suitable market solutions for small to midsize drones and UAVs.

Space-based GPS jamming detection with Spire Global

Another solution to defend against GPS jamming involves detecting the source of GPS jamming signals from space using state-of-the-art satellite technology like ours at Spire Global.

At Spire, our approach to GPS jamming detection involves our growing constellation of small satellites orbiting the globe in LEO.

Our satellites are equipped with GNSS reflectometry (GNSS-R) payloads that study GNSS signals (GPS signals) reflected and scattered by the Earth’s surface. The L-band antennas capture raw recordings of these data, which can be used to detect and geolocate the source of GPS jammers.

While this approach is more reactive than it is defensive, it can be a highly useful tool that can help eliminate threats from a variety of environments and mitigate future risks by taking action at the source.

For those with ongoing GPS anti-jamming needs, Spire even offers custom-built satellite constellations that can be tasked by location, mission, and more to help reduce the risk to operations or safeguard everything from military missions to supply chain logistics.

Interested in our unique constellation capabilities?

Learn about Signals Intelligence Constellations

GNSS jammers: A high-Level overview

GNSS jammers are typically used on the ground and directly impact the timing, velocity, and positioning data of GNSS signals. While these systems provide pinpoint accuracy for global navigation and remain reliable through severe weather conditions, GNSS is vulnerable to several types of attacks, namely GNSS jamming and GNSS spoofing.

Why is GNSS so susceptible to interference?

Due to their weak nature, GNSS and GPS signals are vulnerable to jamming. They travel from satellites operating in Low Earth Orbit around 20,000km above the Earth’s surface, so by the time they reach the ground receivers, they are easily disrupted by radio frequency interference.

Since relatively weak Radio Frequency (RF) signals are strong enough to overpower GNSS signals, they can result in unintentional jamming occurrences. However, the most problematic jamming is done intentionally, and cheap GNSS and GPS jammers can be purchased easily online despite being illegal in many countries.

GNSS jamming most often targets civilian and military maritime and aviation industries. It has become common to hear of corrupted AIS and ADS-B signals from ships and aircraft, which ultimately indicate a likelihood of GNSS jamming.

Methods for geolocating terrestrial GNSS jammers

Without first knowing where a GNSS jammer is emitting its signals from, it makes it more or less impossible to stifle the attack. So, the first step to mitigating the dangers of GNSS jamming… Geolocation of the jammer.

Two strategies for geolocating terrestrial GNSS jammers involve ground station networks and satellites in low earth orbit, each outlined in detail below.

Geolocation with ground station networks

When testing how well a network of ground-based receivers could geolocate jamming emitters, it was found that the ground stations could geolocate and even track chirp-style and matched-code jamming signals relatively well.

Still, receivers at fixed locations or those tactically deployed in a section of airspace can only locate jamming emitters in the immediate surrounding area, not across wide spatial ranges. Therefore, ground station networks can only be used in a limited scope of scenarios, and the need for global, low-latency, accurate GNSS interference detection remains a vital element of jamming mitigation. 

Geolocation with multiple LEO satellites

GNSS jamming signals can also be detected and geolocated with satellites in Low Earth Orbit. In fact, satellite geolocation techniques can even classify the type of jammer and jamming signal being used, allowing a much more direct mitigation process when necessary.

Unlike ground networks, LEO-based geolocation offers global coverage and a frequent refresh rate, giving a more in-depth view of terrestrial GNSS interference sources like jamming and spoofing.

Further, since LEO satellites are so far from the interference source, they can track authentic GNSS signals, allowing precise time-tagged data collection from time-synchronized LEO-based receivers and precise orbit determination. LEO satellites with these time-synchronized receivers provide the best possible approach to locating GNSS jammers.

Two-step geolocation from LEO (T/FDOA)

While accurately geolocating jamming emitters with arbitrary waveforms using just one single satellite is impossible, geolocating emitters generating arbitrary wideband signals is possible. Multiple receivers use ‘Time and Frequency Difference of Arrival’ (T/FDOA) measurements in a two-step process to estimate emitter locations to geolocate wideband signals.

The first step involves comparing captured signals against one another and producing a time series of T/FDOA observables. The set of observables is then input into a non-linear algorithm to geolocate the source.

Still, there are two weaknesses of two-step geolocation that can’t be overlooked.

1. Two-step geolocation ignores the typical constraint that all measurements should be consistent with either;
   • A single position (stationary emitters)
   • A single trajectory (moving emitters)
2. Interference signals displaying cyclostationarity create structures in T/FDOA measurements that make it challenging to track single emitters.
   • When multiple cyclostationary emitters with overlapping frequencies and a wide power range are present, tracking and geolocation become particularly challenging.

Single-step geolocation from LEO (direct geolocation)

Direct geolocation is an often superior multiple-receiver strategy that involves just a single-step – searching a geographical grid to estimate a jamming emitter’s location using the observed signals.

In direct geolocation, TDOA and FDOA data from the jamming emitter’s radar pulse are collected over numerous periods. Simultaneously, altitude measurements are taken from an aircraft. Once collected, the T/FDOA and aircraft altitude measurements can be used to estimate the emitter’s location (longitude/latitude) for each period.

Once a location is calculated for each time period, each is averaged to form a final estimated position of the jammer.

Direct geolocation is superior to the two-step geolocation method in low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) environments and scenarios with short data capture, ultimately making it the most suitable choice for LEO-based jammer geolocation.

Exploring Spire Global’s GNSS jammer geolocation capabilities

At Spire, we have a growing constellation of CubeSats operating in LEO carrying flexible SDR radios, which are used for detecting and geolocating GNSS jamming signals with a direct geolocation approach.

A primary component of our detection capabilities is a GNSS reflectometry (GNSS-R) instrument – studying GNSS signals that are scattered or reflected off the Earth’s surface.

The GNSS-R is a flexible SDR receiver equipped with two high-gain nadir-oriented L-band antennas capable of capturing raw recordings and precise measurements of GNSS signals from Earth. Further, the L-band antenna is dual-frequency, which allows precise satellite positioning, making GNSS-R satellites and their variants highly suitable for GNSS jamming geolocation.

Multi-satellite GNSS interference monitoring

Spire’s multi-satellite approach uses two LEO satellites flying in parallel formation or numerous other techniques when using three or more satellites. Spire uses state-of-the-art, hybrid TDOA/FDOA approaches to provide radio frequency geolocation when multiple satellites receive the same signal of interest.

Single-satellite GNSS interference monitoring

Single-satellite interference monitoring uses Doppler-based measurements to geolocate interference. While this geolocation strategy is more challenging, it is a more cost-effective alternative to the multi-satellite approach.

Case study: Spire detects GNSS interference signals with GNSS-RO satellites

With just a few days’ notice, Spire successfully leveraged their multi-satellite geolocation approach for the US government using their GNSS-RO satellites.

During live jamming tests, Spire assigned three satellites to collect raw Intermediate Frequency (IF) data. The RO CubeSats’ antenna polarization and orientation were suitable, and they successfully detected known jamming signals from specific GPS jammers.

Two or more of the satellite passes were aligned in space and time to observe the active jammer and collect raw IF data.

The first data set showed a clear increase in spectral activity in the L-1 band. Upon analysis, the expected real PRN signals and evidence of false PRN broadcasts were shown. The Doppler observations for the false PRNs matched the expected characteristics of a jammer in the test location, so Spire concluded that the signals were, in fact, jamming signals.

About Spire’s independent satellite constellations

Here at Spire, we’ve solidified our position as one of the global leaders in the development and deployment of independent satellite constellations – designed to meet the specific needs of various industries and applications.

How can we say we are global leaders in independently owned and operated constellation solutions?

We’ve developed lasting relationships with innovative and impactful organizations around the globe, supporting some of the world’s most demanding applications with critical data and space infrastructure.

Our tailored constellations enable entities to gather precise, mission-specific data in near real-time, enabling unmatched decision-making based on complex data rather than a hunch. Since our constellations can be built with specific payloads and tasked to mission-specific applications, it allows users in nearly every industry to drive growth and facilitate profits.

Spire x Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC): Enhancing RF geolocation from LEO

Spire recently partnered with the Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), a trusted leader in aerospace, defense, and electronics solutions, to grow their network of RF-enabled satellites and enhance their ability to locate Earth-bound RF emission sources from Low Earth Orbit (LEO).

Spire’s cluster of four 6U satellites helps SNC detect and geolocate objects near the Earth’s surface using radio frequency (RF) emissions, to enhance government and military insights into RF interference threats and develop strategies to limit risks.

Spire’s independent satellite constellations allow SNC to improve its RF detection capabilities with secure, scalable, and proven RF technologies. Since SNC can task the 6U cluster for specific objectives, it allows a more affordable, more flexible approach to LEO-based missions.

Paired with SNC’s 12+ years of experience developing algorithms, analytics, and process automation, Spire aims to showcase how its independent LEO-based satellites can successfully address the growing market need for RF data collection and analysis.

Spire satellite formations and functionality

Spire’s tailored constellations can be configured in various formations, be it clusters of two, three, or four – or a series of satellites flying in an “orbital plane.” Configuration flexibility allows for the creation of hyper-specific solutions that not only maximize data coverage but also ensure collection accuracy and efficiency.

Satellite clusters

Each cluster, regardless of configuration, is designed to work cohesively. The clusters are tailored using geolocation techniques like triangulation, TDOA, and FDOA – all of which deconstruct data alongside one another for high-level insights. The satellites within each cluster can be adjusted dynamically to adapt to evolving mission needs or environmental conditions, ensuring that the data delivered is relevant and actionable.

Satellite clusters typically operate in a triangle or box formation. By orbiting the Earth in a consistent formation, they are able to execute data collection and deliver insights with a higher level of accuracy than just one satellite.

An example of this would be when an entity like the US military needs to identify the source of new or recurring GPS interference. When GPS interference (RF interference) occurs, unusual RF emissions in the GPS frequency range are typically present. Our GNSS-R payloads are designed to capture these emissions, and using a TDOA/FDOA approach, we can geolocate the source of the emissions (typically a GPS jammer) with a high level of accuracy.

Satellites orbiting “in plane”

The other way we maintain orbit for our mono-satellite constellations is through satellite drag and other satellite operation techniques, including propulsion when required for a specific customer mission. In this formation, satellites orbit the Earth in a linear pattern, allowing data to be collected continuously over a broader scale. This helps monitor larger areas of the planet and is particularly beneficial for continuous monitoring of things like climate and other environmental parameters.

An example of this would be atmospheric phenomena like hurricanes. By maintaining a consistent orbital plane, these satellites can provide continuous data on temperature, humidity, wind speed, and cloud cover across vast regions. This real-time data is crucial for predicting weather patterns and issuing timely warnings, significantly enhancing disaster preparedness and response.

Spire Satellite constellation technical specifications

Our constellations are incredibly flexible and ready to scale, allowing our customers to deploy new platforms to collect and process data on board. Our customers can conduct in-orbit feasibility trials and add new dimensions to existing infrastructure without overhauling the systems.

Our customers control their payloads directly through a proprietary API without human intervention. Their commands and data flow through the Spire network, fully encrypted, with the option to add a second layer of client-side encryption using keys that only the customer controls.

Further, our satellite constellations are equipped with off-the-shelf ISR products that can be deployed in as little as nine months, allowing any organization or national agency to build its own state-of-the-art intelligence capabilities when needed.

View Spire’s satellite constellation product offers

Spire’s Constellation Management Platform

Spire’s Constellation Management Platform (CMP) is the go-to tool for customers to streamline satellite control – automating constellation operations, simplifying tasking, and enabling real-time communication with all space assets. Our CMP improves customer accessibility through seamless connection to Spires proprietary API and allows your team to focus its time and resources on assessing mission data.

To learn more about how we can simplify space anywhere, anytime, be sure to visit our Constellation Management Platform page. You can book a call with a Spire consultant or explore a platform demo to see how it can help manage your mission.

Visi Spire’sConstellation Management Platform

Who we serve

With 14+ years of experience serving clients in government & military, maritime, weather & climate, and aviation, Spire offers actionable intelligence with real-time data for customers in nearly every industry.

Government and Defense

Over the years, we’ve helped facilitate and progress NASA missions, unearth strategies used by drug cartels to bring illicit contraband across borders, and delivered RF interference insights to the US military that support national security and defense.

While terrestrial defense systems can help secure borders and coastal areas, their limitations cap their impact. With the rise of mission-specific satellite constellations, governments, militaries, and maritime authorities can task satellites for hyper-specific and global-scale purposes – bypassing the physical and geographic limitations involved with terrestrial systems.

What makes Spire’s capabilities so impactful?

1. Unclassified data sharing: Often, when government agencies need to share specific data, they are unable to do so due to the strict security regulations in place. Since Spire’s constellations are private and free of these regulations, government customers and their allies can send and receive data without violating laws. Not only is Spire able to legally support this type of data-sharing, but our constellations and data networks can do it with incredible speed, streamlining communications between government branches and global allies.
2. Service Level Agreement (SLA) monitoring: As part of the Constellation Management Platform, Spire’s standardized API tool helps customers manage and track project KPIs, providing real-time asset performance insights and optional deviation alerts. The SLA also offers schedule and performance guarantees, providing baked-in reliability that ensures confidence in the system’s operational performance.

Maritime organizations

Our independent satellite constellations support maritime organizations with offshore asset surveillance, commodity and market intelligence, warfare intelligence, flag administration support, and more.

One of the biggest advantages of mission-specific constellations in the maritime industry involves identifying and tracking vessels in real-time using Radio Frequency (RF) data collection – which is crucial for monitoring ship routes and ensuring asset safety at sea.

The high-performing RF payloads aboard our LEO satellites capture data in a wide range of frequency bands, including UHF, S-Band, X-Band, Ku Band & Ka-Band. This wide range of data capture allows us to decipher ship positions when signals are spoofed, jammed, or halted, and we deliver the insights promptly and with near-global coverage.

Aviation safety and security

GNSS interference is a rapidly growing threat in the aviation industry, which affects everything from civilian flights to military operations. GNSS jamming and GNSS spoofing are both increasingly common tactics being used that are affecting the safety and security of those operating or managing aircraft, so being able to identify the source of this interference and make better-informed decisions is becoming increasingly important.

One of Spire’s goals for the future is to help secure the aviation and security sectors, and we are doing it with the enhanced detection and geolocation of GNSS interference signals.

To do this, we leverage our growing satellite constellations, advanced payloads, and advanced AI and ML algorithms to take raw ADS-B data (primarily from commercial aircraft) and categorize it by interference likelihood and threat level, allowing air traffic controllers and pilots to operate confidently and better manage risk.

Spire’s capability to collect more reliable ADS-B data through miniaturized LEO satellite and TRL 9 sensor technology allows us to build a constellation that can offer near real-time, global coverage.  All the collected data is cataloged and can be accessed by our clients for historical data insights and trend analysis.

We also pair our ADS-B data with additional aircraft, flight, and weather information, which can be deployed to satisfy needs in flight operations, geospatial intelligence, border management, insurance risk management, application development, financial analysis, travel analytics, tourism, and more.

Weather and Climate entities

It’s no secret that the changing climate is taking a severe toll on people and the planet. Natural disasters are increasingly common, agricultural production is less consistent and harder to manage, and water resources are becoming more and more scarce.

These changes, which are difficult to monitor and assess from the ground, can be devastating to industries and economies, leading to an increasing demand for space-based solutions.

At Spire, our satellites are equipped with an advanced, in-house designed GNSS receiver that powers our climate and weather products. We can process signals from all major GNSS constellations (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou, QZSS) and up to 32 simultaneous reflections, allowing us to offer industry-leading Earth observation capabilities.

While GNSS signals are originally meant for precise navigation, they can also be used opportunistically to sense and characterize the different layers of the Earth via their precise positioning and time synchronization capabilities.

We leverage two primary types of GNSS observations for weather and climate insights:

1. GNSS-RO (Radio Occultation): As low-elevation GNSS signals traverse the Earth’s atmosphere on their way to our satellites’ antennas, they are refracted by the dense portions of the atmosphere and bend. The magnitude of this bending is dependent on the atmosphere’s temperature, pressure, and humidity content as a function of altitude. GNSS-RO data are similar to those obtained by radio sondes, except that they are acquired with unprecedented global coverage as our satellites continuously orbit the Earth, providing uniquely robust insights on the Earth’s weather.
2. GNSS-R (Reflectometry): When GNSS signals are sent to Earth-bound receivers, some of the signals bounce, or reflect, off of the Earth’s surface. GNSS-R satellites are able to collect these reflections that are “imprinted” with the physical state of the surface and can be used to measure wind speed, wave height, soil moisture, and ice cover.

Satellite constellations – FAQ

What are satellite phones?

Satellite phones are much like how they sound: portable devices that offer connection via telephone, cellular, and other networks using satellites in space. While SAT phones are commonly used in emergencies and natural disasters, their reliability and availability have helped make them a valuable tool for many new scenarios and applications.

How do satellite phones work?

Satellite phones work in a pretty unique way, and until the last decade or so, the method seemed more or less out of reach for daily use.

Satellite phones transmit signals to small satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), about 2,000 km above the Earth’s surface. From there, the signal is relayed to the nearest “gateway,” or land-based center, from where it is sent to the receiving phone (landline, cellular phone, or another SAT phone) anywhere on the surface of the earth where the signal can reach unobstructed.

As long as there is a direct line of sight between the SAT phone, satellite, and gateway, they are able to function without issue.

Since LEO satellite networks typically orbit in a way that allows near-global coverage at any point in time, SAT phones are an undeniably useful tool to maintain communication, especially where typical cellular networks are unavailable.

The basic components of satellite phone systems

SAT phone systems are made up of several components that work together to ensure communication in some of the world’s harshest and most remote regions.

1. Satellites: Satellites are the core of the SAT phone system, positioned in orbit to receive and relay signals from satellite phones to ground stations and receiving devices. Depending on the satellite phone system and its primary application, satellites can be based in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), or Geostationary Orbit (GEO), with LEO being the most common in today’s growing market.
2. Satellite phones (user terminals): The satellite phone is the device used by the individual who wishes to communicate with others somewhere else on Earth. Modern SAT phones are compact and equipped with antennas and processors to help ensure seamless communications via signal relays with satellites in orbit.
3. Ground stations (gateways): Ground stations, or gateways, are the Earth-bound facilities that make the connection between the satellite and the receiving device. These stations are a crucial component of satellite phone systems, as they are the base that allows for streamlined communication and can be positioned in a way that there would rarely or never be obstructions that would prevent the satellite signal from being received.
4. Satellite network center: Network centers manage the satellite constellations and oversee the operations of the signal relays and signal processing. Network management is largely automated, although the checks and balances are overseen by network professionals when issues arise.

Benefits of LEO-connected satellite phones

The growing number of LEO-based constellations and their advanced and innovative capabilities are driving global connectivity with satellite phone networks. Rather than using satellites in MEO or GEO, LEO satellites can deliver some distinct and competitive features.

Better signal quality

With less distance between SAT phones and satellites, LEO satellites offer improved signal quality with fewer opportunities for signal degradation. Clear and uninterrupted communication is a key component of making satellite phones a staple in modern communication.

Lower latency

Since LEO satellites are situated much closer to Earth than GEO satellites, the signals travel to their destination at a much faster speed. The quick relay allows for faster communication that can enhance real-time calls – something that is extremely important in high-risk scenarios.

Flexible coverage

Since most LEO satellites orbit the entire Earth in a matter of 1-2 hours, LEO constellations can provide near-global coverage and ensure there is always a satellite within view of the SAT phone. In some instances (think military operations), LEO satellites can be deployed to an area or region of interest to ensure further connectivity.

Cost-effective deployments

LEO satellites can be deployed into orbit at much lower costs than GEO satellites, primarily due to their compact size. GEO satellites require much greater precision and complex launches, making LEO satellites far more ideal for constellation development or constellation expansion.

Low power requirements

Compared to GEO satellites, LEO satellites require far less powerful ground-based antennas for seamless communication, mostly because of the close distance of orbit. The low power requirements also allow for smaller satellite phones that don’t require as much power to operate.

Market overview of satellite phones

While satellite phones were once considered niche tools used by explorers, military operatives, and remote fishermen, they have since re-emerged as valuable tools for a much larger audience.

Today, alongside the evolution of aerospace technologies and other related communications, satellite phones are used to connect the world’s most remote regions and overcome some of the more complex modern communications challenges.

On the opposite side of the coin are the nefarious uses for SAT phones. Satellite phones are used by entities like criminal organizations, shipping companies, and illegal fishing (IUU fishing) fleets to do everything from trafficking contraband to trading sanctioned goods.

With the increased value and applicability to everyday life, along with lower costs and higher availability, satellite phones are poised to show significant growth in the coming decade.

Historical evolution of SAT phones

Satellite phones were first conceptualized about half a century ago, in the 1970s, when space agencies began strategizing with telecommunications companies to enhance global communication using satellite technology. While none of the early-stage satellite phones were meant to be available for commercial use, they were aimed at military and research applications.

The first commercially available satellite phones made their debut in the late 1990s. The first major milestone was when Iridium Communications launched its constellation of 60+ satellites that provided global communications coverage, giving birth to the first commercial SAT phones. While the milestone was certainly an important part of history, these base-level satellite phones cost users around $1300 and up to $7.00 per minute of use  – making it relatively out of reach for the everyday user. After spending nearly $5 billion to get the network up and running, Iridium was only able to capture about 55,000 users due to the bulky build, high device price point, and lofty cost of service.

In the early 2000s, satellite phone technology became more accessible and more advanced. Technological innovations led us to less bulky SAT phone builds, better coverage in some of the world’s most remote regions, and data services that included texting and email. While innovations were made to improve the satellite phone landscape, they did not boom enough to become mainstream.

From 2010 to 2020, even bigger innovations were made, and more players entered the commercially competitive landscape. Satellite phones have become compatible with smartphones, and smartphone technology could be integrated with satellite-driven capabilities. Inmarsat and Thuraya were two of the biggest players continuing development, although more entities were making their debut during this time.

Fast forward to today, and we are looking at a whole new era of satellite phone technology.

Companies like SpaceX, OneWeb, and Telesat are some of the newest players in the SAT phone game, all of which are operating constellations of small satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Since these companies operate in space with a narrowed scope of focus, they are able to innovate and provide even better coverage and reliability than companies in the past.

Low latency, high data speeds, and more expansive constellations are some of the biggest drivers of change, which ultimately translate to lower costs and broader availability for the daily user. The IoT solutions offered by these new-age constellations provide access to broader audiences and many new applications, which is helping drive safety and efficiency in numerous types of businesses, from tourism to exploration.

Today’s market value and projected growth

According to Allied Market Research, the global SAT phone market was valued at over $550 million in 2021, with projections showing a CAGR of 3.9% through 2031. At these estimates, the global satellite phone market will reach an estimated value of over $800 million by 2032.

The following sections outline why we are seeing such rapid growth and what is changing to make SAT phones more accessible and interesting to the public.

Growing number of applications

A big part of the projected growth in this market is due to a robust and growing network infrastructure and the mission-critical applications the networks can serve.

For example, year after year, we see more weather and climate-related disasters, all of which wreak havoc on global communications and public safety. With climate-related risk on a growing trajectory, nations around the world are looking to build network access and ensure communications, especially when disaster strikes.

Another aspect of the growth is military-based. Communication warfare tactics like GPS jamming, RF spoofing, and other types of RF interference are on a bee-line growth trajectory, leaving government and military entities scrambling to overcome the strategies. Since militaries need to maintain open and uninterrupted lines of communication at base or in conflict zones, satellite phones are valuable tools that help ensure public safety, national security, and mission success.

The market growth in civilian sectors over the past few years has come from a number of sources, although most of the growth has resulted from operations related to media, tourism, and other types of entrepreneurial businesses.

When operating a business or executing a project in remote areas, rarely explored parts of the world, or conflict zones, conventional cell coverage is normally unreliable, at best. Even when coverage is available in remote or hard-to-reach areas, the financial costs involved with connectivity are often high. Using satellite-based communication helps build resilience to local or regional communications challenges, ultimately improving the safety and reliability of an operation or activity.

Increased coverage and reliability

With a rapidly increasing number of space-focused entities and satellite constellations in space, particularly those operating in LEO, the coverage and reliability of satellite phone networks have grown tremendously. Not only are some satellite constellations expansive enough to provide near-global coverage autonomously, but some satellite services now have the capability to be maneuvered and set on course to satisfy unique coverage demands.

While most consumer satellite phone networks aren’t manually controlled, satellites used for things like military communications are rerouted in high-stakes scenarios, operations in remote areas, or conflict zones where threats like GPS jamming and GPS spoofing exist.

Affordability and accessibility

Part of what makes the modern satellite phone and its network so accessible and affordable for the modern consumer is the technological advancements. Not only are we able to build smaller, more capable, and more deployable satellites, but we are able to do it on an unprecedented scale.

Modern satellites, often built at the size of a toaster or microwave, are deployable much easier and faster than in the past. Since both rockets and satellites are being built at much lower costs and can enter orbit more easily and on a much faster timeline, we are seeing the enhanced communications capabilities grow by the day.

With some of the biggest satellite players in the game equipping satellites with SAT phone-capable technologies, we are now able to service the modern consumer with reliable communications at the furthest corners of the globe.

Rather than relying on costly ground communications infrastructure, companies can service the user from a global satellite constellation, moving past challenges involved with rugged geography, remote regions, and countries with controlled regulations on communication.

Advanced features

Many advanced features are driving the market growth for consumer satellite phones, with one of the most important features being GPS and location service integration.

Modern SAT phones come with built-in GPS, which allows the user to track or send their location to others in moments of distress or danger. GPS features are particularly important for scenarios like scientific expeditions, open ocean fishing operations, and search and rescue, although GPS can be valuable in a wide range of different situations.

One thing to consider is that even though satellite phones can send and receive signals in nearly every part of the world, GPS may not function in certain GPS-denied environments.

Another important feature of modern SAT phones is their advanced security features, especially for those involved in military, trade, or other information-sensitive positions. Data encryption, secure voice and text communications, and access security all make the modern SAT phone a valuable tool to operate without the threat of intrusion.

IoT integration is another feature that has pushed the modern satellite phone into an exciting new era. Since satellite phones can be integrated with all sorts of IoT devices, users are able to monitor, control, and adjust everything from agricultural equipment to supply chain logistics. As these capabilities continue to grow, we can expect to see more streamlined and affordable pathways to operate and navigate the modern landscape.

The dark side of satellite phones: Communication for illicit purposes

With the near-global coverage and seamless communication benefits of satellite phone networks, SAT phones are being used more and more for illegal and illicit purposes. While satellite phones make great assets for good, they can also be deployed with relative security for those looking to fly under the law’s radar or bypass local and regional policies and regulations.

Below, we look at just some of the ways SAT phone networks are misused by individuals, criminal organizations, and more.

Drug, weapons, and human trafficking

Traffickers of all kinds have a long history of employing new and innovative methods to ensure the success of their operations. With the rise of satellite phones, namely due to their easy access and affordability, it’s no surprise that drug, weapon, and human traffickers are using the technologies to their advantage.

Traffickers are already using strategies like dark shipping and semi-submersibles to transport their products across large areas of the ocean undetected. As you might expect, cell coverage can be non-existent in some parts of the sea, and standard cellular or radio communications make it easy to get caught by authorities. By using satellite phones to communicate during illegal routes, traffickers are able to bypass some of the historical challenges they’ve faced.

One recent news story from the Washington Post describes how drug trafficking organizations used the Galápagos Islands as a stop-off point to refuel their fast boats en route with cocaine cargo. One man was interviewed and explained how the organization would use satellite phones to organize trafficking routes. Authorities have since mapped the alleged satellite phone signals of cocaine smugglers in the area, which can be seen on the map below.

Terrorism

With the hard-to-track nature of satellite phones, terrorist groups have also been known to employ the technology for their benefit. Terrorists use SAT phones to plan attacks, coordinate strikes, organize with other members of the group, and evade detection by authorities.

In 2022, militant groups in Kashmir, a remote and mountainous region in the north of India, were reportedly using Iridium satellite phones to operate under the radar. According to the source, the SAT phones were aiding the terrorists in evading detection and capture during the night. According to officials, Iridium satellite phone signatures were detected in the months leading up to the news story, with some signatures even seen south of Kashmir – showing just how widespread the use of satellite phones has become within the particular terrorist organization.

Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing

Satellite phones play a key role in illegal fishing operations, primarily due to the near-global coverage that can be used in even the most remote parts of the ocean.

Often, illegal fishing fleets will only operate in areas where they can maintain contact with their organization or at least keep an eye on authorities or other potential threats. Since your standard methods of communication are easily detectable by maritime authorities, satellite phones offer an easy and affordable alternative to staying connected.

For example, if someone in the organization is monitoring the area for authorities and sees someone coming for one of their ships, they can quickly contact that ship and have them exit the area before the authorities arrive.

Another use is to manage fleets or operations. Communication can be made from far, far away, and the “controller” can manage multiple vessels in a fleet to coordinate efforts for the biggest ROI. Crews can coordinate with each other, share valuable intel on catch, and provide information on fishing grounds that might otherwise go uncommunicated.

Mitigating the risk: Geolocating satellite phones with space-based RF detection

In order to secure Earth-bound domains and protect the public from the illegal and illicit use of satellite phones, we must look to a similar area for answers: Space.

Geolocating satellite phones from space involves locating the Radio Frequency (RF) signals from the device. Basically, any device that uses radio signals to operate something called Radio Frequency data, otherwise known as RF emissions. These signals can be geolocated from space with a combination of satellites, ground systems, and complex geolocation techniques that have been revolutionized by some of today’s biggest and most innovative space-as-a-service companies.

To understand better, let’s take a closer look at RF geolocation below.

Satellite geolocation

Satellites equipped with various types of RF payloads are already operating by the dozens in space. Spire’s constellation, for example, uses its satellites in various ways for RF geolocation. Spire’s constellation can geolocate RF signals with a single satellite (although less efficient), a cluster of two satellites, or a cluster of 3-4 satellites.

The most effective and efficient geolocation method is using three or more satellites, as the signals can be triangulated faster and more accurately. With three or more satellites, the area of interest (AOI) can also be increased, so rather than using a precise tip-and-cue method for narrowing the area under observation, a broader view can be used to find the frequency of interest.

One of the biggest upsides to satellite-based RF geolocation is that with a fully deployed RF constellation, users can make highly accurate RF collections in near real-time. This allows the user to take action without hesitation, whether that’s deploying authorities to a location or strategizing for further surveillance. In scenarios involving drug and weapons trafficking or terrorism, time is of the essence, and every second counts in order to mitigate the fallout.

Satellite geolocation techniques

Numerous techniques are available to help geolocate RF signals from space, a few of which are outlined below.

Triangulation

Triangulation is a process used with multiple satellites that measure the angles and time of delay between signals received by the sensors at known locations, which are part of each satellite’s payload. By using the measurements and calculating the data accordingly, the position of the SAT phone can be determined quite accurately.

While RF signals from satellite phones can be tracked with the use of ground stations, satellites offer the most accurate and efficient pathway to geolocation.

Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA)

Simply put, TDOA measures the time it takes a signal to reach multiple known receivers. In this case, the receivers are aboard the LEO satellites. By comparing the time differences at each receiver, it is possible to determine the location of the RF signal emitted by the SAT phone.

The incredibly precise time clocks used in TDOA measurements are key instruments for success in this method.

Frequency Difference of Arrival (FDOA)

While TDOA measures the time it takes for signals to reach a receiver, FDOA measures the “Doppler Shift” in the frequency of the signal as it relates to each satellite receiver. Frequency shifts are caused by the movement between the satellite phone and the satellite receiver over time between the data at each timestamp.

By analyzing these shifts and calculating them between each receiver, RF signals are able to be geolocated accurately.

Unmatched SAT phone detection & geolocation

Spire owns and operates one of the largest LEO satellite constellations that deliver RF intelligence, serving world-class clients like NASA, NOAA, and the European Space Agency (ESA). We’ve cemented our role as an industry leader in RF detection and geolocation by offering customized, scalable solutions for clients in sectors that serve climate, maritime, aviation, and space reconnaissance needs.

The RF payloads aboard our proprietary satellite constellations capture a wide range of frequency bands, offering near-global coverage for all types of devices, from VHF marine radios to state-of-the-art satellite phones.

Our tailored solutions for RF intelligence offer a flexible strategy for deploying mission-specific technologies, including Spire-hosted payloads and total satellite operations management. The customizable approach to space-based RF intelligence allows entities to pursue mission-centric goals, fully supported by Spire’s extensive RF infrastructure and operational expertise.

Still, RF data alone isn’t what makes Spire stand out in the realm of RF intelligence. Spire’s unmatched value-add is the ability to mix and match various types of data, including optical and SAR, to create hyper-focused intelligence that goes beyond waning industry norms.

Theresa Condor, COO of Spire, said it best, “So it’s not just, “Oh, we do analysis on optical imaging.” It will be, “We do analysis and help a business come up with an understanding and decision that merges optical and SAR and various types of RF data.”

It will come down more and more to, ‘What is the problem, and how is it helping arrive at the right decision to take in a timely way,’ and less about what the technique is.”